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Abstract
A conspicuous amount of aggregate tail risk is missing from the price of financial sector
crash insurance during the 2007-2009 crisis. The difference in costs of out-of-the-money put
options for individual banks, and puts on the financial sector index, increases fourfold from its
pre-crisis level. At the same time, correlations among bank stocks surge, suggesting the high
put spread cannot be attributed to a relative increase in idiosyncratic risk. We show that this
phenomenon is unique to the financial sector, that it cannot be explained by observed risk
dynamics (volatilities and correlations), and that illiquidity and no-arbitrage violations are
unlikely culprits. Instead, we provide evidence that a collective government guarantee for the
financial sector lowers index put prices far more than those of individual banks, explaining
the divergence in the basket-index spread. By embedding a bailout in the standard one-factor
option pricing model, we can closely replicate observed put spread dynamics. During the
crisis, the spread responds acutely to government intervention announcements.
Keywords: systemic risk, government bailout, too-big-to-fail, option pricing models, finan-
cial crisis
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1 Introduction
Despite wide acknowledgment as an episode of elevated systemic risk, prices of crash insurance
on US financial sector equity reflect a conspicuous absence of aggregate tail risk during the crisis
of 2007-2009. Out-of-the-money (OTM) put options on the financial sector stock index are cheap
relative to individual put options on the individual banks that comprise the index. The difference
between the cost of a basket of banks’ put options, and the cost of a moneyness-matched financial
sector index put, reaches 15.9 cents per dollar insured in March 2009, or 60% of the cost of the
financial index put. Before the onset of the crisis, this spread never exceeded 3.8 cents on the
dollar.
The high basket-index spread in the financial sector is puzzling. The basket of put options
provides insurance against both common and idiosyncratic bank stock crashes, while the index put
option only insures states of the world that prompt a common financial sector crash. Standard
option pricing logic therefore requires a disproportionate increase in idiosyncratic risk (relative
to aggregate risk) to explain a dramatic increase in the put spread. A puzzle arises because, as
is common in turbulent markets, correlations among financial stocks also surge throughout the
crisis. The drastic rise in idiosyncratic risks necessary to explain the put spread would counter-
factually imply a sharp decrease in stock return correlations. These two facts, simultaneous spikes
in correlations and the financial sector basket-index put spread, are at odds with standard asset
pricing models. If anything, the standard model suggests that a rapid increase in return correlations
should have raised the price of OTM index options relative to the option basket, causing the put
spread to shrink.
Our findings are unique to financial sector puts. Divergence in the put spread is much larger
for the financial sector than for any other sector and, consistent with the logic of the standard
model, the prices of basket and index call options in all sectors converge during the crisis. Further,
the phenomenon we document cannot be attributed to observed financial sector risk dynamics
during the crisis. We consider the possibility that the dramatic rise in volatilities during the
crisis drives the put spread wider, but find that this explains only a small portion of the spread
divergence that we identify. We can rule out transactions costs, since constructing the spread
using the most costly combination of bid and ask quotes continues to produce a wide basket-index
put spread. Liquidity differences across various types of options (index versus individual, puts
versus calls, or financial firms versus non-financials) are inconsistent with the put spread arising
because of illiquidity. Mispricings due to capital constraints, counter-party risk, and short sale
restrictions are unlikely culprits. A trade that takes advantage of the basket-index spread does
not tie up significant capital and occurs through exchanges with a clearing house in the middle.
These option positions are marked-to-market daily and ultimately guaranteed by the AAA-rated
Options Clearing Corporation. The short sale ban was in place only for a brief portion of our
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sample, applied equally to individual and index options, and market makers were exempted from
it. Nor do short sale lending fees for financial stocks line up with the put spread dynamics that we
document.
Instead, we provide direct and indirect evidence that a sector-wide bailout guarantee was largely
responsible for the divergence of individual and index put prices during the recent crisis. The
anticipation of future government intervention during a financial sector collapse would depress
markets for crash insurance. In effect, implicit bailout guarantees are crash insurance subsidies
for anyone holding stock in the banking sector, and this subsidy drives down the prices investors
were willing to pay for the traded, private version of insurance. Since any individual bank may
still fail amid a collective guarantee, or the failure of a single firm may not be sufficient to trigger
government intervention, the downward pressure on individual bank puts is much weaker than the
effect on index puts. Looking at this effect through the lens of the well-documented put option
implied volatility skew, we show that the government’s guarantee flattens the volatility skew for
put options on the financial sector index, but has little effect on the individual bank put skew. We
find no evidence of skew flattening for non-financial indices.
A standard option pricing model, perhaps unsurprisingly, fails to describe the put spread evolu-
tion observed during the crisis. However, after embedding a government guarantee in the standard
model, realized volatility and correlation dynamics in the financial sector produce a model-implied
put spread strikingly similar to that in the data. We argue that this analysis provides indirect ev-
idence that a government guarantee can account for dynamics of the basket-index put spread over
our sample. The most accurate match of the spread requires a government bailout that truncates
the sector-wide equity return at a 55% loss. By comparing the bailout-adjusted and the standard
bailout-free cost of an option-based hedge against a financial sector crash, we obtain a dollar esti-
mate of the value of the government guarantee for the financial sector. According to this estimate,
government support to banks’ equity was $0.63 billion before mid-2007 and rose to $42.38 billion
between mid-2007 and mid-2009. It peaked at well over $150 billion.
Furthermore, an event study of the financial sector put spread evolution provides direct evidence
of option price sensitivity to government guarantees. The spread increases on average by 1.64 cents
(64%) in the first five days after government announcements that ex ante increase the probability
of a bailout, while it decreases on average 1.92 cents (23%) after announcements that have the
opposite effect (and after adjusting for contemporaneous changes in financial sector risk). The
largest increase in the spread (60%) was registered in the first five days after the U.S. Congress
approved the TARP bailout. We also document differences in put prices across banks. Risk-
adjusted put prices for large banks are significantly lower than puts on their smaller peers, indicating
investors perceive differences in bailout likelihoods across institutions aligned with the notion of
“too-systemic-to-fail.” Both of these results support the collective guarantee hypothesis.1
1One may argue that the put spread widens even in the absence of a bailout if tail risk (say, in the form of
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Our work connects to various strands of the literature. First, it is linked to the problem of
measuring systemic risk in the financial sector.2 Our findings highlight a fundamental complication
to the problem of measuring systemic risk from market prices. All else equal, the basket-index
spread for OTM put options would be a natural measure of systemic risk: the smaller the basket-
index spread in a sector, the larger the amount of systemic risk in that sector. However, in sectors
that benefit from an implicit or explicit collective guarantee, an increase in the basket-index spread
may occur when systemic risk peaks and the collective bailout guarantee is more likely to kick in.
Hence, the anticipation of future government intervention is embedded in market prices today
and makes them less informative about the true nature of tail risk. This feedback from anticipated
corrective action to market prices echoes the problem of a board of directors looking at share prices
to fire a CEO in the presence of rational investors anticipating this behavior (Bond, Goldstein, and
Prescott, 2010). A similar situation arises in the context of a central bank setting interest rates via
a Taylor rule, which depends on expected inflation, when agents form expectations about inflation
in part based on the central bank’s policy rule.
Effects of too-systemic-to-fail government guarantees remain highly uncertain and intensely
researched. A number of papers measure the impact of these guarantees on the total value of
the firm. Lucas and McDonald (2006, 2010) take an option-based approach to valuing guarantees
extended to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Veronesi and Zingales (2010) use CDS data to measure
the value of government bailouts to bondholders and stockholders of the largest financial firms
from the Paulson plan. They estimate that this plan increased the total value of banks’ balance
sheets by $131 billion.
Our paper focuses exclusively on equity. In principle, bailouts of bondholders and other creditors
do not imply that the value of equity is protected. However, there may be massive uncertainty
about the resolution regime in practice, especially for large financial institutions. As a result,
collective guarantees tend to benefit shareholders as well because the government is aware that
bankruptcy costs start well before the value of bank equity actually hits zero. A contribution of
this paper is to demonstrate that financial sector guarantees can massively prop up bank equity
value. Our findings also suggests a substantial reduction in the cost of equity for systemically risky
financial firms. This is consistent with Gandhi and Lustig (2010), who show that large banks have
risk-adjusted equity returns 5% per annum lower than those of the smallest banks, a difference that
they attribute to an implicit guarantee for large banks. In a seminal paper on this topic, O’Hara
and Shaw (1990) document large positive wealth effects for shareholders of banks who were declared
high subprime mortgage exposure) is concentrated in one or two banks, but investors don’t know which banks these
are. We find this scenario, in which there is no real “systemic” risk, counterfactual since the government has little
incentive to intervene in this situation. Alternatively, there may be a small number of banks with direct exposure
to an extreme shock, with other banks having indirect tail exposure via their linkages with exposed banks. This
scenario is consistent with our notion of systemic risk, and is approximated by our reduced form factor model.
2See Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010); Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010); Brownless and
Engle (2010); Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2011) for recent advances in systemic risk measurement.
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too-big-to-fail by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1984, and negative wealth effects for those
banks that were not included.
Other recent studies have also examined the relative pricing of derivative securities. Coval,
Jurek, and Stafford (2009) compare the prices of CDX tranches to those of index options prior
to and during the financial crisis, and they conclude that CDX tranches are overpriced relative
to index options.3 Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2009), Carr and Wu (2009) and Schurhoff
and Ziegler (2011) study prices of index versus individual options. Typically, index options are
considered expensive because their prices consistently exceed values implied by standard models
(Bondarenko, 2003). Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2009) argue that this is because index
options provide a valuable hedge against increases in correlation, while individual name options do
not possess this feature. We find that index put options in the financial sector are different. They
are always less expensive than those for other sectors, and they become especially cheap during
the crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After defining index and basket put and call
spreads and their relationship in Section 2, we document their empirical behavior in the finan-
cial sector and in all other non-financial sectors in Section 3. Section 4 corrects the basket-index
spread for changes in volatility with the help of a simple Black-Scholes model. Section 5 intro-
duces a bailout guarantee into Black-Scholes, and shows that this model helps account for the
observed basket-index spread dynamics. Section 6 finds direct evidence for our collective govern-
ment guarantee hypothesis in the events of the 2007-2009 crisis. Section 7 studies and rules out
potential alternative explanations, including counterparty risk, mispricing, short sales constraints,
hedging costs and liquidity. The last section concludes. Technical details are relegated to a separate
appendix.
2 Sector Insurance
Equity options markets are especially well-suited to gauge the market’s perception of too-systemic-
to-fail guarantees. Since guarantees only kick in during a financial crisis, their effect should be
most visible in the prices of assets that mostly reflect tail risk, like put options. One may insure
against a common financial sector crash by buying puts on each individual financial institution, or
by buying a put on the financial sector index. In this section we propose a comparison of these
insurance schemes that is useful for identifying investor perceptions of government guarantees.
We focus on a traded sector index i comprised of different stocks j. Si,j and si,j are the price
per share and number of shares outstanding, respectively, for stock j in index i. The dollar cost
3Note that a comparison of single-name CDS and the CDX index (modulo changes in the index composition
through defaults) is different because the cost of a basket of credit default swaps has to be equal to the CDX index
to rule out arbitrage opportunities.
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of the index, i.e., the total market cap of all the firms in the index, is given by
∑Ni
j=1 si,jSi,j , while
the price level of the index, Si, is a constant fraction 1/scalei of the total index market cap (thus
scalei =
∑Ni
j=1 si,jSi,j/Si). We use Put
basket
i to denote the price of a basket of put options on all
stocks: Putbasketi =
∑Ni
j=1 si,jPuti,j. We use Put
index
i to denote the price of a put option on the
sector index (similarly for calls).
The basket of put options provides insurance against both common and idiosyncratic stock
price crashes, while the index put option only insures states of the world that prompt a common
crash. The difference between the costs of these insurance schemes is informative about the rel-
ative importance of aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, and is also informative about sector-wide
government guarantees.
Strike-Matched Basket To align our comparison between insurance costs, we impose that the
total strike price of the two schemes are equal, an approach that we refer to as “strike-matching.”
To do so, we first choose index strike price Ki to match a given ∆.
4 Second, we search for options
on individual stocks in the index (all of which must share the same ∆, though this may be different
from the index ∆) such that their strike prices Ki,j (j = 1, 2, . . . , Ni) satisfy
scaleiKi =
Ni∑
j=1
si,jKi,j.
The strike price of the index (in dollars) equals the share-weighted sum of the individual strike
prices as in Equation (4).
With strike-matching, the cost of the basket has to exceed the cost of the index option by no
arbitrage, which bounds the basket-index spread below from zero. The payoffs at maturity satisfy
the following inequality:
Ni∑
j=1
si,jmax(Ki,j − STi,j, 0) ≥ max(scaleiKi −
Ni∑
j=1
si,jS
T
i,j, 0).
First note that, for each j, si,j max(Ki,j−STi,j, 0) ≥ si,j(Ki,j−STi,j). This implies that
∑Ni
j=1 si,j max(Ki,j−
STi,j, 0) ≥ scaleiKi−
∑Ni
j=1 si,jS
T
i,j . This also means that
∑Ni
j=1 si,j max(Ki,j−STi,j , 0) ≥ max(scaleiKi−∑Ni
j=1 si,jS
T
i,j, 0), because the left hand side is non-negative. Since the payoff from the option basket
exceeds that of the index option, its cost must be weakly higher as well.
We also note that the ∆ of the index option can differ slightly from the moneyness of the option
4The ∆ of an option is the derivative of the option price with respect to the underlying asset price. While put
options have negative ∆, we use the convention of taking the absolute value, so that all ∆s are positive. ∆ measures
the moneyness of an option, with low values such as 20 indicating out-of-the-money options and high values such
as 80 indicating in-the-money options. Short-dated at-the-money forward options have a ∆ of approximately 50.
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basket. In Appendix B, we consider an alternative method for constructing the basket that uses
index and individual options that all have the same moneyness, hence the ∆ is equalized across
the two insurance schemes. As results in the appendix show, the conclusions from spreads based
on either matching scheme are identical.5
Cost Per Dollar Insured To compare prices across time, sectors, and between puts and calls,
we define the cost per dollar insured as the price of an option position divided by the dollar amount
that it insures. We then define the basket-index put spread as the difference in the per dollar costs
of basket and index insurance:
Putspreadi =
Putbasketi∑Ni
j=1 si,jKi,j
− scalei × Put
index
i∑Ni
j=1 si,jKi,j
.
Call spreads are defined analogously.
3 Measuring the Basket-Index Spread
This section describes the behavior of basket-index option spreads observed in the data. We
find that OTM put options on the index were cheap during the financial crisis relative to the
individual stock options, while OTM index calls were relatively expensive. This pattern is much
more pronounced for the financial sector than for non-financial sectors.
3.1 Data
We use daily option data from January 1, 2003 until June 30, 2009. This includes option prices on
the nine S&P 500 sector index exchange-traded funds (ETFs) traded on the CBOE.6 As ETFs trade
like stocks, options on these products are similar to options on an individual stock. The nine sector
ETFs conveniently have no overlap and collectively span the entire S&P 500. Appendix A contains
more details and lists the top 40 holdings in the financial sector ETF.7 We also use individual
option data for all members of the S&P 500. The OptionMetrics Volatility Surface provides daily
European put and call option prices that have been interpolated over a grid of time-to-maturity
5We also compare index and basket put prices using options positions that share the same sensitivity to changes
in stock return volatility (the so called option “vega”). With the vega-matched approach, spreads between index
and basket put prices widen even more for financials versus non-financials compared to the strike-matched results
reported below. Detailed estimates from our vega-matched put price comparison are available upon request.
6We use SPDR ETFs. SPDRs are a large ETF family traded in the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific
and managed by State Street Global Advisors. Options on SPDR sector ETFs are physically settled and have an
American-style exercise feature.
7Our sample length is constrained by the availability of ETF option data. For the financial sector (but not for
all non-financial sectors), we are able to go back to January 1999. The properties of our main object of interest, the
basket-index put spread for financials, do not materially change if we start in 1999.
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(TTM) and option ∆, and that are adjusted to account for the American option feature of the raw
option data.8 These constant maturity and constant moneyness options are available at various
intervals between 30 and 730 days to maturity and at values of (absolute) ∆ ranging from 20 to
80. We focus primarily on options with 365 days to maturity and ∆ of 20. Implied volatility data
are from the interpolated implied volatility surface of OptionMetrics. We use CRSP for returns,
market cap, and number of shares outstanding for sector ETFs and individual stocks. We calculate
realized volatility of index and individual stock returns, as well as realized correlations between
individual stocks. All of our calculations track the varying composition of the S&P 500 index (as
well as the sector indices) to maintain consistency between the composition of the option basket
and the index option each day.9
3.2 Main Facts
Panel I in Table I provides summary statistics for the basket-index spread, in cents per dollar
insured, using the strike-matched approach with ∆ = 20 and TTM = 365. The first two columns
report results for the financial sector. Columns three and four report results for a value-weighted
average of the eight non-financial sectors. The last two columns report the differences in the
spread between the financial and non-financial sectors. An increase in the spread between the
basket and the index means index options become cheaper relative to the individual options. We
report statistics for three samples: The entire January 2003 to June 2009 sample, the January 2003
to July 2007 pre-crisis sample, and the August 2007 to June 2009 crisis sample.
Over the pre-crisis sample, the mean spread for OTM puts is 1.7 cents per dollar in the financial
sector, and 2.3 cents in the non-financial sectors. During the crisis, the mean put spread is 5.9 cents
per dollar for financials and 3.7 cents for non-financials. While there is an across-the-board increase
in the put spread from pre-crisis to crisis, the increase is much more pronounced for financials (3.4
times versus 1.6 times). The largest basket-index put spread for financials is 15.9 cents per dollar,
recorded on March 6, 2009. It represents 60% of the cost of the index option on that day. On that
same day, the difference between the spread for financials and non-financials peaks at 10.2 cents
per dollar insured. Prior to the crisis, the put spread for financials never exceeds 3.8 cents on the
dollar, and it never exceed the non-financial put spread by more that 0.4 cents.
Across the entire sample and all sectors, the average basket-index spread for OTM calls is
smaller than for puts: 1.0 cents for financials and 2.0 cents for non-financials. OTM call spreads
rise slightly in the crisis, reaching 1.1 cents on average for financials and 2.3 cents for non-financials.
8The option price adjustment performed by OptionMetrics converts prices of American options into equivalent
European option prices. This allows us to compare them to the European option price formula we later compute in
our model.
9Our results remain unchanged when we focus on the subset of firms that remain in the financial sector index
throughout our sample.
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Appendix Table B reports results for our second approach to constructing the basket-index
spread in which the ∆s of the two insurance schemes are equalized. We see the same pattern as
with the strike-matching approach. The time series correlation between these two measures is over
99%. Basket-index spreads are somewhat larger when we match the share-weighted strike price.
This is because strike-matching uses individual options that have slightly higher ∆ than index
options used, which increases spreads. The average ∆-matched put spread during the crisis is 3.8
cents per dollar for financials (compared to 5.9 cents in Table I). The maximum spread is 12.5 cents
per dollar insured (compared to 15.9). This number represents 70% of the cost of the index put
on March 6, 2009 (compared to 60%). On that same day, the difference between the put spread
for financials and non-financials peaks at 9.1 cents per dollar.
The top panel of Figure 1 plots financial sector put prices for the entire sample. The solid
line shows the cost of the basket of put options per dollar insured and the dashed line plots the
cost of the financial sector put index. Before the crisis, the put spread (dotted line) is small and
essentially constant at less than two cents per dollar. During the crisis, it increases as the index
option gradually becomes cheaper relative to the basket of puts. The basket cost occasionally
exceeds 30 cents per dollar while the cost of the index put rarely rises above 20 cents.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 plots call option prices and the call spread. During the crisis,
the difference between index calls and the basket of individual calls remains unchanged from its
pre-crisis level. We find essentially the same results for call spreads in all other sectors.
Figure 2 compares the put spread of financials and non-financials over time (the dotted lines
from the previous figure). For non-financials (solid line), the basket-index spread remains very low
until October 2008. For financials (dashed line) on the other hand, the put spread starts to widen
in August 2007 (the asset-backed commercial paper crisis), spikes in March 2008 (the collapse of
Bear Stearns), and then spikes further after the bailouts of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. After a decline in November and December of
2008, the basket-index spread peaks a second time with the rescue of AIG in March 2009. The
dotted line plots the difference in put spread between the financial sector and non-financial sectors.
This difference is positive throughout the crisis, except for a few days in November of 2008. It
increases from the summer of 2007 to October 2008, falls until the end of 2008, and increases
dramatically from January to March 2009. None of the eight non-financial sectors experiences
anywhere near the large run up in put spreads seen in the financial sector.
3.3 The Effect of Time-To-Maturity
Panel II of Table I studies the cost of insurance when TTM is 30 days instead of 365 days. As
we show later, these shorter maturity option contracts are more liquid. Naturally, all basket-index
spreads are smaller for shorter-dated options since option prices increase with TTM . However the
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spread patterns are the same as in Panel I. The average put spread for financials is 1.4 cents per
dollar in the crisis, up from 0.4 cents pre-crisis. This represents an increase by a factor of 3.4. Per
unit of time (that is, relative to the ratio of the square root of maturities), the put spread increase
during the crisis is larger for TTM = 30 options than for TTM = 365 options. The 30 day spread
reaches a maximum of 4.0 cents on the dollar, or 52% of the cost of the index option on that day.
For non-financials, the put spread increases by a factor of 1.7 (from 0.5 before the crisis to 0.8 cents
during the crisis). Call spreads for both financials and non-financials increase during the crisis, by
a factor of 1.8 for financials and 1.5 for non-financials.
3.4 The Effect of Moneyness
Table II reports the cost of insurance for the basket versus the index as a function of moneyness (∆).
It follows the format of Table I. Option prices are naturally higher when options are further in-the-
money (ITM), and results show that basket-index spreads also increase in moneyness. However,
the proportional increase in the basket-index spread from pre-crisis to crisis is larger for OTM
put options than for at-the-money (ATM) puts. The put spread increases by a factor of 3.4 for
∆ = 20, 3.7 for ∆ = 30, 3.0 for ∆ = 40, and 2.6 for ∆ = 50. For non-financials, the put spread
increase during the crisis is far smaller than for financials across moneyness. The difference between
financials and non-financials (reported in the last column) during the crisis is much larger for OTM
puts (2.2 cents per dollar at ∆ = 20 and 1.0 at ∆ = 50). As a fraction of the average crisis cost
per dollar insured for financial sector index puts, the financials minus non-financials put spreads
are larger for deep OTM options (22% for ∆ = 20 versus 5% for ∆ = 50). Similarly, the difference
in maximum put spread (as a fraction of the financials index crisis maximum) falls from 38% to
22% as moneyness increases from ∆ = 20 to ∆ = 50.
3.5 Bid-Ask Spreads of Options
To ensure that the increase in the basket-index put spread is not solely due to wider bid-ask spreads
during the crisis, we reconstruct an alternative basket-index spread series using raw option price
quotes rather than the interpolated volatility surface provided by OptionMetrics. This also serves
as a check that OptionMetrics interpolated prices do not suffer from inaccurate extrapolation
or reliance on illiquid contracts. To summarize, results from raw options data combined with
accounting for bid-ask spreads and contract liquidity generates put spreads that are qualitatively
identical, and quantitatively very similar, to the results we reported above.
For this analysis, we construct synthetic options with constant maturity (365 days) and constant
∆ (30) by interpolating raw option prices in a similar vein as OptionMetrics. There are two
key differences with the OptionMetrics methodology that makes our approach particularly robust.
First, we restrict the universe of raw options to those with positive open interest in order to ensure a
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minimum degree of liquidity.10 Second, when constructing synthetic options with constant maturity
and constant ∆, we strictly interpolate and never extrapolate. In particular, we require at least one
option with ∆ above 30 and one with ∆ below 30, and similarly require one option with maturity
greater than 365 and one with maturity less than 365. Often a stock has only one option near
∆ = 20, which is why we construct synthetic options with ∆ = 30. Finally, to account for bid-ask
spreads, all individual option prices are set equal to the bid price, and all index option prices are
set equal to their ask price. This results in the most conservative spread in prices of index puts
versus the basket of individual puts, so that the bid-ask-adjusted put spread is always narrower
than the spread calculated from midquotes.
The resulting “net of transaction costs” basket-index put spread has very similar behavior to
the ∆ = 20 and TTM = 365 spread series documented above. Their correlation is 96% (0.93%)
over the entire (crisis) sample. The “net of transaction costs” put spread for financials is 1.1 cents
per dollar before the crisis, rising to 3.5 cents during the crisis. For non-financial, the spread goes
from 1.7 to 2.1 cents. The result is an additional increase of two cents per dollar for financials
relative to non-financials, quantitatively consistent with the 2.7 cents estimate presented earlier.
3.6 Sector Analysis
Table III compares the basket-index spread for all nine sectors of the S&P 500. The only other
industries which experience significant increases in the basket-index spreads during the crisis are
the consumer discretionary sector and the materials sector. Major components of this sector are
car manufacturers (Ford and GM) and parts suppliers (e.g., Goodyear and Johnson Controls).
This sector also includes retail, home construction (e.g., D. R. Horton and KB Home), hotels
(e.g., Marriott and Harrah’s) and other businesses with substantial direct and indirect real estate
exposure.11 The basket-index spread peaks at 12.4 cents per dollar insured for this industry,
increasing from an a pre-crisis average of 2.9 cents per dollar insured to 5.1 (rising by a factor of 1.8
over the pre-crisis level, versus a factor of 3.4 for financials). It is conceivable that this sector benefits
more than other non-financial sectors when the collective guarantee for the financial sector kicks
in. The auto industry also benefited directly from a federal government bailout in fourth quarter
of 2008. The materials sector ETF has similarly large exposure to businesses benefitting from
government guarantees. Examples include US Steel, whose large customers include the automotive
and construction industries, and Weyerhaeuser, which produces building materials and operates a
large real estate development segment.
10Results are similar if we instead require that contracts have positive volume.
11Discretionary spending of U.S. consumers experienced the largest post-war decrease during the last quarter of
2008.
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3.7 Bending the Implied Volatility Skew
Another indicator of the relative costs of index and basket insurance on the financial sector is the
difference in their implied volatility skew (the plot of option implied volatilities as a function of
option moneyness). The top panel of Figure 3 shows the difference between the implied volatility
skew for the financial sector put basket and the index put. During the crisis (circles), the difference
between the implied volatility of the basket and that of the index reaches a maximum of 11.5% for
∆ = 20, and gradually decreases to 9% for ∆ = 50. This evidence is consistent with the presence of
a government guarantee which effectively flattens the implied volatility skew for index put options
much more than for individual options in the financial sector. Intuitively, this downward sloping
pattern arises because a government guarantee has a larger relative impact on index put prices with
lower strike prices. In the pre-crisis sample (squares), the basket-index skew spread was flat across
moneyness. The same flat shape appears for the basket-index skew spread in non-financial sectors,
both pre-crisis (diamonds) and during the crisis (stars). Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 3
plots the implied volatility skew spread inferred from calls. Here we see the exact opposite pattern.
During the crisis, the financial sector basket-index skew spread for calls actually has a positive
slope (circles). This is because OTM index call options were substantially more expensive and
therefore closer to the price of the basket of calls, while the prices of ATM index calls were much
further from the basket price. This is consistent with observed elevated return correlations, and
what we would expect to see (including for puts) in the absence of a bailout guarantee.
In the options literature, the variance risk premium, which differences implied variances against
a realized variance benchmark, offers yet another evaluation of the relative expense of an option
position (Carr and Wu, 2009). When implied volatilities are high relative to realized volatilities,
the option is expensive relative to the riskiness of the underlying. For financials, the variance risk
premium fell from 0.02 before the crisis to -0.20 during the crisis, providing a further indication
that the relative value of financial index puts fell over this time. For non-financials, the variance
risk premium increases slightly during the crisis.12
Similarly, the difference between implied and realized volatility is useful in assessing how price
levels of financial and non-financial sector indices affect the put spread. On the first trading day of
2007, the share price of the financials sector ETF and the value-weighted average price of the eight
non-financial sector ETFs were roughly equal at $36.92 and $36.40. By March 2009, the financial
sector had reached as low as $6.18 per share, while the non-financial fell as low as $19.26. Figure
4 compares daily Black-Scholes implied volatilities minus realized volatilities for the financial and
non-financial indices versus the index price level. These data are broken out for the pre-crisis and
12In order to align realized variance with the forward-looking nature of one year implied variance, we calculate
realized variance using a forward-looking 252-day rolling variance of daily returns on the underlying. Our estimated
effects on the variance risk premium are quantitatively robust to using backward looking rolling windows and shorter
window lengths.
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crisis periods, and best fit lines are estimated for each subsample. In the pre-crisis period, the
relation of implied minus realized volatility to the index level is similar across sectors. The slope
of the best fit line for financials is -0.002, similar to -0.001 for non-financials. During the crisis,
however, the best fit slope for financials rises to 0.015, while the non-financials slope becomes 0.004.
The relatively low implied volatility for financials in the second plot suggests that financial sector
index puts were particularly cheap during the crisis. The best fit slope of the non-financials, which
is substantially shallower than that of financials during the crisis, further suggests that this fact
cannot be explained by differences in prices of the underlyings during the crisis.
4 A Benchmark Model Without Guarantees
In this section, we consider the possibility that the dramatic increase in volatilities and correlations
during the crisis may differentially affect individual and index options, leading in and of itself to
an increase in the basket-index put spread. We work from a simple Gaussian option pricing model
that we interpret as a counterfactual. It quantifies how observed changes in risks would affect
the put spread in the absence of a government guarantee, under the simplifying assumption that
returns follow a one-factor Gaussian process. Comparing realized put spreads against a model-based
counterfactual allows us to decompose the data into two parts: The portion of spreads explainable
by a standard Black and Scholes (1973) (henceforth BS) model, and the residual portion that may
be interpreted as a non-Gaussian skewness effect. While it is well known that the BS model does
not accurately price index options (Bondarenko, 2003; Pan, 2002), it is nevertheless an interesting
lens through which to study the basket-index spread data, in the same tradition as using BS to
study implied volatilities. We conclude that this simple model can only explain a small portion of
the spread run up that we identify.
4.1 Single-Factor Model
We use a simple single-factor model to price options, similar to the one used by Vasicek (2002) to
value loan portfolios. The log of the stock return on an individual stock follows:
rindiv = µ− λJa + σdǫ,
where the shock ǫ is an idiosyncratic shock which is standard normally distributed and i.i.d. over
time and across firms. Ja is a sector-wide shock, also i.i.d. and normally distributed: Ja ∼
N (0, δ2r). We assume that the index is composed of ex-ante identical firms. To account for sector
concentration, we choose the number of stand-in firms in sector i, N it , to match the observed inverse
Herfindahl of value weights ωj,i,t for firm j in sector index i on day t: N
i
t = (
∑
j ω
2
j,i,t)
−1. We use
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σindext,i to denote the day t volatility of the index return in sector i. The volatility of the index is
related to the volatility of the stand-in firm, σindivt,i , according to
σindext,i =
√
Nt +Nt(Nt − 1)ρt,i
N2t
σindivt,i , (1)
where ρt,i is an estimate of the return correlation between individual firms in sector i.
As when we constructed the empirical spread, we choose index options with ∆ = 20 (yielding
strike price Kt). The same Kt is in turn used for the individual option. We then feed in a daily
risk-free rate rt, the strike Kt, and estimates of index volatility σ
index
t,i and individual stock volatility
σindivt,i to compute BS prices for the index option and the basket of options with maturity T equal
to one year:13
PutBS,indext,i = BS(σ
index
t,i , Kt, rt, T ), and Put
BS,basket
t,i = BS(σ
indiv
t,i , Kt, rt, T ). (2)
The BS basket-index put spread, in cost per dollar insured, is (PutBS,baskett,i −PutBS,indext,i )/Kt. The
analysis for call options is analogous.14
4.2 Model-Based Spreads
We first calculate BS model-implied basket-index spreads for ∆ = 20 puts. Our goal is to determine
if the Black-Scholes model can account for the increase in put spreads during the crisis, once we
control for observed increases in individual and index volatility. To estimate index volatility, we
use the daily series of BS implied volatilities for the index option, σindext,i , which provides a close
match of the financial index put price by construction. To arrive at an estimate of individual
option volatilities, we use the daily sequence of realized correlations, ρt,i, together with the index
(implied) volatility in Equation (1).15 From these inputs, Equation (2) delivers a BS index and
basket put option price. We follow the same procedure for the non-financial sectors, as well as for
call options.
Table IV reports Black-Scholes put prices, taking into account the estimated volatility and
correlation dynamics. The left half of the table shows results for financials, the right half shows
non-financials. Side-by-side we report the BS value and the observed value of the index option
(columns 1 and 2), the basket (columns 3 and 4), and the basket-index spread (columns 5 and
6). Column 7 reports the difference between the basket-index spread in the data, and the spread
13We use the yield curve provided by OptionMetrics to estimate the interest rate r for maturity T .
14The model-implied spreads described here use a strike-matching procedure, just as in Section 3.
15Daily pairwise conditional correlations for stocks are estimated using the exponential smoother with smoothing
parameter 0.95. Pairwise correlations within the sector are then averaged each day, weighted by the pairs’ combined
market equity.
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generated by the Black-Scholes model.
The model fails to match the sharp increase in the price of the basket in the crisis. In the data,
the financial sector put spread increases by a factor of 3.4 (from 1.7 cents per dollar to 5.9), while
in the BS model in only increases by a factor of 1.2 (from 3.5 cents to 4.1). This is because BS
overprices the basket by 1.8 cents per dollar before the crisis, and underprices it by 1.8 cents during
the crisis. Said differently, the volatility level effect contributes only 0.6 cents to the 4.2 cent (per
dollar insured) increase in the put spread. The maximum spread conveys the same message: In the
data it reaches 15.9 cents, while the maximum BS spread is only 8.1 cents. The trough-to-peak
swing in basket-index spreads is about 7 cents in the BS model and more than 14 cents in the data.
The right half of Table IV shows the results for non-financials. During the crisis, the BS put
spread falls slightly (column 5), compared to a modest increase in the data (column 6). In the full
sample and in each subsample, the difference between the observed put spread for non-financials
and its BS-implied value is negative (column 7), and more negative than in the financial sector. This
means that non-financial index puts are uniformly more expensive than financial index puts even
after controlling for the relative price of a basket of puts, and after controlling for risk differences
in a standard one-factor model. The last column of Table IV reports a difference-in-differences
number, simultaneously differencing the basket and the index, financials versus non-financials, and
data versus Black-Scholes. On average, financial index put options are 2.2 cents per dollar cheaper
during the crisis and 0.3 cents cheaper before the crisis than the non-financial index after this
multi-dimensional comparison. The maximum financial index put discount is 7.8 cents per dollar
during the crisis and 3.4 before the crisis.
Figure 5 plots the difference between the actual and BS-implied spread for the put options on
financials (dashed line) and non-financials (solid line). The dotted line plots the difference. The
plot shows that the gap between the put spread in the data and BS for financials consistently
exceeds that of non-financials, even before the crisis. This implies that financial index puts are
consistently cheap relative to both BS and non-financials. In sum, the run up in financial sector
put spreads during the crisis cannot be explained in the standard framework.16
4.3 Black-Scholes Implied Correlations
The increase in put spreads during the crisis is puzzling when viewed alongside the concurrent
spike in correlations among financial firms. The single-factor Black-Scholes framework allows us
to examine this point in more detail. Instead of evaluating model put spreads at values of realized
16Our analysis of Black-Scholes model-implied put spreads, as well as the implied correlation analysis below,
proxy for index volatility using option-implied volatilities from OptionMetrics. In robustness, we consider instead
proxying for volatility using forecasts under the physical measure. In particular, we repeat these analyses using
GARCH volatility forecasts and realized rolling volatilities. In both cases, our conclusions remain unchanged: the
BS model has tremendous difficulty accounting for the increase in the basket-index put spread observed in the data.
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correlation, we may instead invert the put spread formula to back out daily implied correlations
ρt,i, given observed index volatility and put spreads (along with Equation (1)). As above, index
volatility is proxied with observed implied volatilities. The resulting option-implied correlations
are a normalized comparison of the prices on the basket of options and the index option. High
implied correlations, compared to realized correlations, indicate that index options are relatively
expensive.
Table V reports realized correlations calculated from stock returns, model-implied correlations,
and their difference. Prior to the crisis, implied correlations from OTM puts in the financial sector
are 19 percentage points higher than actual correlations. During the crisis, the realized correlation
increases by 20 percentage points, while model-implied correlations fall by seven percentage points.
In other words, when we translate the observed put spread series into implied correlations, their
behavior is exactly counter to crisis correlations observed in the data. This anomaly is unique to
financial sector puts. For puts in non-financial sectors, and for calls in all sectors, implied and
realized correlations both rise during the crisis.17
4.4 Too-Big-To-Fail: Largest Banks
According to the too-systemic-to-fail hypothesis, some banks are so large and interconnected that
their failure may lead to economic disaster. In this spirit, heterogeneity in systemic risk can lead
to some banks having higher bailout likelihoods than others. We find evidence that government
guarantees primarily benefit large banks, consistent with the the too-systemic-to-fail hypothesis.
We focus on a group of 12 large banks that include the ten largest U.S. financial institutions by
market cap at the onset of the crisis, plus Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This group accounted for
over half the market cap of the sector index in July 2007. For each of these financial institutions,
we estimate individual return volatility each day as a one year rolling window of daily return
volatility. We then use the one-factor Black-Scholes model of Section 4.1 to compute their put
option prices. Table VI reports put prices for the largest banks. The first column reports the
BS-adjusted cost of the basket of all financials (about 90 firms) as a reference point. The second
column reports BS-adjusted prices for the basket of puts consisting of only the 12 largest banks.
Remaining columns break out the difference between the actual and BS-implied put prices for each
large bank. Prior to the crisis, large banks’ OTM put options are 0.4 cents per dollar cheaper than
the sector average, after adjusting for volatility effects via BS. This difference rises sixfold during
the crisis, as large banks become 2.8 cents per dollar cheaper than the full sector average. While
BS-adjusted put option prices increase during the crisis for the average bank stock, they decrease
17Results are nearly identical for short-dated options with TTM of 30 days. We omit this analysis in the interest
of space.
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for the largest banks. This striking conclusion holds for nine out of the 12 banks.18
5 Benchmark Model with a Government Guarantee
The previous sections show a large increase in the basket-index put spread for financials relative
to non-financials and show that this spread was not accounted for by volatility dynamics. In this
section, we show that observed basket-index put spread dynamics can be accounted for by a simple
option pricing model, once a collective government guarantee is assumed. This provides indirect
evidence for our hypothesis that the government played an important role in generating observed
spread patterns. In Section 6 we provide direct evidence based on an event study of government
announcements.
We extend the simple single-factor model developed in Section 4 and assume that the maximum
sector-wide loss rate tolerated by the government is fixed (and common knowledge). While the
resulting model still faces substantial challenges in accounting for the level of individual and index
option prices, as one might expect from a Black-Scholes type model, it is the simplest model to
illustrate the effect of collective bailout guarantees.19
Log stock returns for the stand-in individual stock follow the same process as in Section 4 with
the following exception. The single sector-wide shock is truncated by a government guarantee.
This truncation occurs at J <∞, and modifies the sector-wide shock as
Ja = min(Jr, J), Jr ∼ N (0, δ2r).
We derive a closed-form expression for the bailout-adjusted index put and basket put prices:
PutBail,indext,i = BS
Bail(σindext,i , Kt, rt, T, µt,i, J), and Put
Bail,basket
t,i = BS
Bail(σindivt,i , Kt, rt, T, µt,i, J). (3)
Appendix D contains the derivation of the put option prices; it relies on results in Appendix C and
on auxiliary lemmas stated in Appendix F. Bailout-adjusted option prices depend on two additional
parameters: (i) J is the maximum loss tolerated by the government and (ii) µt,i is the expected
return on the stocks in sector i. The strike-matched Black-Scholes basket-index spread is defined
as before.
18Two of the three for which BS-adjusted option prices rise are Freddie Mac and Freddie Mae, which actually fail
in September 2008. This failure wiped out the equity holders, and the rise in their put prices during the crisis (in
this case August 2007-September 2008) reflects the increased probability of a collapse.
19The NBER working paper version of this paper considers a model with disasters that accurately matches both
option pricing levels and the basket-index spread, but only once a bailout guarantee is introduced. That model
requires several auxiliary assumptions which we avoid in the simplified model here.
16
5.1 Model-Based Spreads with a Government Guarantee
To compute the basket-index spread in the presence of a bailout, we follow the same procedure that
we described in Section 4. We feed in option-implied index volatility and realized correlations and
use Equation (1) to obtain the stand-in firm’s volatility. We also need an estimate of the expected
return µt,i. To obtain a model-free, option-based estimate for the expected return (in levels), we
use the simple variance swap of idea of Martin (2011).20 Appendix E discusses the details and
shows how expected returns, volatilities, and correlations relate to the structural parameters of the
model. The model delivers a daily put price for the basket and the index via Equation (3).
The solid line in Figure 6 plots the basket-index spread in the bailout model (with J = 0.60)
against the observed basket-index spread (dashed line). The key result is that the model-implied
spread closely tracks the spread in the data once a bailout is embedded in the standard model. The
correlation between the two is 81% (0.86%) over the entire (crisis) sample. The bailout-adjusted
spread from the model peaks at 16.3 cents per dollar insured, versus 15.9 in the data (strike-
matched). The dotted line plots the difference in put spreads from the models with and without
a bailout guarantee. The correlation between this difference and the put spread in the data is
67% over the entire sample (62% during crisis). While the bailout model misses part of the initial
run-up in the basket-index spread after March 2008, it does a remarkable job of explaining the
remaining variation.
Table VII reports the basket-index put spread for the bailout model for different values of the
guarantee threshold J , and compares it to the data. The top panel is for financials, the bottom
panel for non-financials. The put spreads in both the data and the bailout model are differenced
against put spreads from the no-bailout Black-Scholes model. A lower value for J makes the
government guarantee stronger and eliminates more of the aggregate downside risk. The column
J = ∞ recovers the original bailout-free BS model. The effect of J on the put spread is non-
monotonic since the price of sector-wide risk has to increase to match the risk premium, which
starts to lower the basket-index spread as the bailout becomes weaker (that is, when J is large).
Prior to the crisis, the average put spread in the data (in deviation from Black-Scholes) is -1.8
cents. At pre-crisis risk levels, the bailout model struggles to generate much difference with the
no-bailout model for most values of J , and hence fails to account for the fact that index put
options are relatively expensive in normal times. The real test for the bailout mechanism is the
crisis sample. When we choose the maximum loss to be J of 0.60 (which implies a maximum loss
rate of 51% in levels), the model delivers a BS-adjusted spread of 1.5 cents per dollar, close to the
20Martin (2011) derives a model free notion of implied volatility, SV IX , from an equally weighted average of put
and call prices at different strikes. He uses SV IX to derive a lower bound on the expected risk premium under
weak assumptions. To implement our empirics, we assume the lower bound is satisfied with equality. We separately
compute SV IX for financials and for the non-financial sectors. Note that, since it is based on options data, our
expected return estimate reflects all potential effects of sector-wide guarantees on stock returns. This makes the
empirical quantity directly comparable to the theoretical expected return entering the put price formula.
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1.8 cents in the data. The maximum spread is 8.1 cents per dollar, again close to the 9.3 cents in
the data.
Panel II of Table VII shows that the effects of a similar-size guarantee are much smaller for non-
financials. While the increase in the BS-adjusted put spread is small in the data (1.3 cents), it is
smaller still in the model (0.1 cents when J = 0.60). There is not enough volatility in non-financial
stock returns to make the guarantee more valuable.21
For a given maximum loss rate J , we can estimate the dollar value of the bailout by computing
the cost of obtaining downside insurance for the sector (using index options) with and without
the bailout guarantee. The difference is our estimate of the total value of the bailout guarantee.
Holding fixed J = 0.60, the average crisis value of the bailout is $42.38 bn, compared to $0.63 bn
before the crisis. At its peak, the guarantee to equityholders of the financial sector is valued at
nearly $160 bn.
6 Government Announcements
In this section, we provide direct evidence that the dynamics of the basket-index spread during the
crisis are closely tied to government policy announcements. Under the collective bailout hypoth-
esis, an increase in the probability of a financial disaster increases the basket-index put spread.
To link the put spread directly to (the market’s perceptions of) the government intervention, we
study policy announcements during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. We focus on significant an-
nouncements for which we can determine the ex-ante sign of the effect on the likelihood (and size)
of a collective bailout. Our evidence suggests that put spreads respond to government announce-
ments in a manner consistent with the collective bailout hypothesis. For this analysis we focus on
BS-adjusted basket-index spreads, thus the results are not simply picking up volatility effects.
We identify six events that increase the probability of a government bailout for shareholders
of the financial sector: (i) July 11, 2008: Paulson requests government funds for Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac (ii) October 3, 2008: Revised bailout plan (TARP) passes the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, (iii) October 6, 2008: The Term Auction Facility is increased to $900bn, (iv) November 25,
2008: The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) is announced, (v) January 16, 2009:
Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC provide assistance to Bank of America, (vi) February 2,
2009: The Federal Reserve announces it is prepared to increase TALF to $1trn. We refer to these
as positive announcement dates.
We also identify six negative announcements that (we expect ex-ante to) decrease the probability
of a bailout for shareholders: (i) March 3, 2008: Bear Stearns is bought for $2 per share, (ii)
21Rather than using the put option-implied volatility as a measure of index return volatility, we can instead use
rolling-window realized volatilities or GARCH-model forecasts to evaluate model-implied spreads, similar to the
analysis in Section 4.4. Results are similar to those using implied volatilities.
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September 15, 2008: Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy, (iii) September 29, 2008: House votes
no on the bailout plan, (iv) October 14, 2008: Treasury announces $250bn capital injections, (v)
November 7, 2008: President Bush warns against too much government intervention in the financial
sector, and (vi) November 13, 2008: Paulson indicates that TARP will not used for buying troubled
assets from banks.
First, we consider the difference-in-differences (data minus Black-Scholes, and basket minus
index) around announcement dates. We find that the basket-index spread of financials increases
after positive announcement dates relative to the implied Black-Scholes value, and declines after
negative announcement dates. Panel I of Figure 7 plots the results. In the five days following
a positive announcement we find an average spread increase of 1.6 cents, or 64%. The five days
following a negative announcement experience an average spread decrease of 1.3 cents, or 40%.
The pre-announcement movements suggest that some announcements may be anticipated by the
market.
Second, we look at a triple difference: financials minus non-financials, data minus Black-Scholes,
and basket minus index. Panel II of Figure 7 plots these differences around announcement dates.
We find that the triple difference increases on average by 0.9 cents, or 28%, in the first five days
following a positive announcement, while it decreases 1.9 cents, or 23%, in the five days following
a negative announcement.
The largest positive effect occurs after the House approves the Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-343) on October 3, which establishes the $700 billion Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP), raising the spread 47% in the first five days after the announcement.
Furthermore, the approval of TARP started a sustained increase in the basket-index spread in the
ensuing period.
The failures of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers initially reduce the basket-index put spread.
The Lehman failure was then followed by an increase in the spread as the resulting turmoil con-
vinced markets that future bailouts would be more likely. The largest negative effect was registered
on October 14, 2008 when the U.S. Treasury announced the TARP would be used as a facility to
purchase up to $250bn in preferred stock of U.S. financial institutions. The Treasury essentially
shifted TARP’s focus from purchasing toxic assets to recapitalizing banks. This decision diluted
existing shareholders, driving the put spread down by 22% over the next five days. This was the
start of a longer decline in the spread that was reinforced by speeches delivered by president Bush
and Secretary Paulson in early November. Clearly, there was a fear that bank shareholders would
not receive the government bailout they had hoped for.
This decline in the spread was reversed only in early January 2009 when the FDIC, the Fed
and the Treasury provided assistance to Bank of America, without diluting existing shareholders.
The put spread started its largest increase in the beginning of February and peaked in March.22
22On February 10, 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner announced a Financial Stability Plan involving Treasury
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Markets were gradually reassured that the government was indeed committed to bailing out
the financial sector without wiping out equity holders. Our measure of the value of the bailout
guarantee suggests that the market was not initially reassured by the TARP program and its
implementation, which consisted mostly of cash infusions from sales of preferred shares. Only
when the Treasury and the Federal Reserve explicitly announces programs to purchase toxic assets
such as mortgage-backed securities does the collective bailout guarantee become valuable.
7 Alternative Explanations
This section consider alternatives to the collective bailout explanation for the behavior of crisis
put spreads, including counter-party risk, mispricing, short sale restrictions, hedging costs, and
liquidity. We conclude that none are consistent with the patterns in the data.
7.1 Counterparty Credit Risk
The most obvious alternative explanation is counterparty risk. OTM financial index put options
pay off in states of the world in which the financial system is potentially in a meltdown. If these
contracts are not honored in these states of the world, that could generate a basket-index spread
increase for put options on financial firms, more so than for other firms.
All of the options traded on the CBOE are cleared by the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC),
which also is the ultimate guarantor of these contracts. The writer of an option is subject to margin
requirements that exceed the current market value of the contract by a margin that provides a
cushion to cover two-day market risk. These margins are exempt from bankruptcy clawbacks. The
positions are marked-to-market on a daily basis. During the crisis, there were intra-day margin
calls as well. In addition, the OCC has a clearing fund. The size of the clearing fund is directly
tied to the volume of transactions. This clearing fund was only tapped once after the crash of 1987,
and the amount was small. The clearing fund was not used during the recent financial crisis, even
though the volume of transactions set a new record. S&P has consistently given the OCC a AAA
rating since 1993. So, counterparty risk seems limited.
Moreover, if counter-party credit risk were the driver of the basket-index spread, then the
percentage effects should be much larger for shorted-dated options. Given that these contracts are
purchases of convertible preferred stock in eligible banks, the creation of a Public-Private Investment Fund to
acquire troubled loans and other assets from financial institutions, expansion of the Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), and new initiatives to stem residential mortgage foreclosures and to support
small business lending. The Federal Reserve Board announced that it was prepared to expand TALF to as much
as $1trn and to broaden eligible collateral to include AAA-rated commercial mortgage-backed securities, private-
label residential mortgage-backed securities, and other asset-backed securities. The expansion of TALF would be
supported by $100bn from TARP. In the last week of February there was discussion of assurances to prop up the
banking system, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
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marked-to-market every day, the effect of counter-party credit risk on a one-year option is of order
σ
√
1/250 rather than σ, because after one day more margin is posted if the index declines enough
during the day, and the contract is collateralized again. However, we find that the basket-index
spreads roughly increase with the square root of the maturity of the contract. For example, for the
strike-matched index with ∆ of 20, the average basket-index spread during the crisis is 5.9 cents
per dollar at TTM = 365, while it is 4.7 cents per dollar after multiplying the TTM = 30 spread
by
√
12. If anything, the effect on the basket-index spread for one-year options is larger.
Finally, the dynamics of the basket-index spread around government announcements are incon-
sistent with a counter-party credit risk explanation. Announcements that increase the likelihood of
a bailout increased the basket-index spread, while negative announcements decreased the basket-
index spread. The counterparty credit risk explanation would obviously predict the opposite effect.
Moreover, it seems hard to argue that the likelihood of a complete meltdown of the financial system
was highest in March 2009, when the basket-index spread peaked.
7.2 Mispricing, Cost of Hedging and Short-Sale Restrictions
Recent research has documented violations of the law of one price in several segments of financial
markets during the crisis. In currency markets, violations of covered interest rate parity have
been documented (see Garleanu and Pedersen, 2009). In government bond markets, there was
mispricing between TIPS, nominal Treasuries and inflation swaps (see Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and
Lustig, 2010). Finally, in corporate bond markets, large arbitrage opportunities opened up between
CDS spreads and the CDX index and between corporate bond yields and CDS (see Mitchell and
Pulvino, 2009). A few factors make the mispricing explanation a less plausible candidate for our
basket-index put spread findings.
First, trading on the difference between the cost of index options and the cost of the basket does
not require substantial capital, unlike some of these other trades (CDS basis trade, TIPS/Treasury
trade). Hence, instances of mispricing in the options basket-index spread due to capital shortages
are less likely to persist (see Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007; Duffie, 2010).
Second, if we attribute our basket-index spread findings to mispricing, we need to explain the
divergence between put and call spreads. This asymmetry rules out most alternative explanations
except perhaps counter-party risk (which we address above) and the cost of hedging.
Single name options and index options have different costs of hedging. Single name options
are hedged with cash market transactions while index options are hedged using futures since the
latter are more liquid. Hedging using cash transactions is more expensive than using futures. This
affects put options more than call options since shorting a stock accrues additional costs, and these
costs can be larger in times of crisis. The difference in the cost of hedging should affect financials
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more than other sectors because there were no futures on most other sectors,23 and because the
difficulty of shorting stocks was concentrated in financials. Therefore the benefit of available futures
contracts on the financials index compared to cash trading was bigger than in other sectors.
In fact, there were explicit short sale restrictions on financial sector stocks. A short sale ban
could push investors to express their bearish view by buying put options instead of shorting stocks.
Market makers or other investors may find writing put options more costly when such positions
cannot be hedged by shorting stock. The SEC imposed a short sale ban from September 19, 2008
until October 8, 2008 which affected 800 financial stocks. From July 21, 2008 onwards, there
was a ban on naked short-selling for Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and 17 large banks. However,
exchange and over-the-counter option market makers where exempted from both SEC rules so that
they could continue to provide liquidity and hedge their positions during the ban. Both the short
window of the ban compared to the period over which the put spread increased and the exemption
for market makers make the short sale ban an unlikely explanation for our findings.
We further explore whether put spreads are driven by short sales constraints by comparing the
difference in cost of shorting financial and non-financials stocks to the difference in put spreads.
To measure short sales costs, we use securities lending fee data from the SEC for each stock in the
S&P 500, and calculate value-weighted average lending fees by sector.24 The difference in lending
fees between financial and non-financial stocks is plotted in Figure 8 (corresponding to left vertical
axis). Alongside the fee difference we also plot the the difference in put spreads (corresponding to
right vertical axis). There is little association between the two series: Changes in lending fees only
have a 3.2% correlation with changes in the put spread.
Finally, our analysis of implied volatility on index options has established that these index
options are cheap during the crisis even when comparing implied and realized volatility. This
comparison does not rely at all on single name option prices.
7.3 Liquidity
Another potential alternative explanation of our findings is that index put options are more liquid
than individual options, and that their relative liquidity rose during the financial crisis. The same
explanation must also apply to call options. We now argue that these liquidity facts are an unlikely
explanation for our findings, often pointing in the opposite direction. These findings corroborate
our bid-ask spread analysis in Section 3.5.
Table VIII reports summary statistics for the liquidity of put options on the S&P 500 index,
23A futures contract on the financial sector (Financial SPCTR futures) was traded on the CME, but not for other
sectors.
24Lending fees for Citigroup appear driven by an outlier observation from a particular lender for the last half of
2009, thus we omit Citigroup from this average. This anomalous Citigroup data point also bears no association to
the behavior of put spreads we document. Including Citigroup in our calculation has no impact on our conclusions
regarding lending fees.
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sector indices (a value-weighted average across all 9 sectors), the financial sector index, all individual
stock options (a value-weighted average), and individual financial stock options. The table reports
daily averages of the bid-ask spread in dollars, the bid-ask spread in percentage of the midpoint
price, trading volume, and open interest. The columns cover the full range of moneyness, from
deep OTM (∆ < 20) to deep ITM (∆ > 80), while the rows report a range of option maturities.
We separately report averages for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. It is worth pointing out that
a substantial fraction of trade in index options takes place in over-the-counter markets, which are
outside our database. Hence, these bid-ask and volume numbers understate the degree of liquidity.
However, absent arbitrage opportunities across trading locations, the option prices in our database
do reflect this additional liquidity.
Deep OTM put options with ∆ < 20 have large spreads, and volume is limited. OTM puts with
∆ between 20 and 50 still have substantial option spreads. For long-dated OTM puts (maturity
in excess of 180 days), the average pre-crisis spread is 5.5% for the S&P 500, 12.8% for the sector
options, 10.8% for the financial sector options, 6.8% for all individual stock options, and 7.0% for
individual stock options in the financial sector. Financial sector index options appear, if anything,
more liquid than other sector index options. The liquidity difference between index and individual
put options is smaller for the financial sector than for the average sector.
Furthermore, during the crisis, the liquidity of the options appears to increase. For long-dated
OTM puts, the spreads decrease from 5.5% to 4.7% for S&P 500 options, from 12.8 to 7.8% for
sector options, from 10.8% to 4.5% for financial sector options, from 6.8 to 5.5% for all individual
options, and from 7.0% to 5.8% for financial firms’ options.25 At the same time, volume and open
interest for long-dated OTM puts increased. Volume increased from 400 to 507 contracts for the
S&P 500 index options, from 45 to 169 for the sector options, from 287 to 1049 for financial index
options, and from 130 to 162 for individual stock options in the financial sector. During the crisis,
trade in OTM financial sector put options invariably exceeds not only trade in the other sector
OTM put options but also trade in the OTM S&P 500 options. The absolute increase in liquidity of
financial sector index puts during the crisis and the relative increase versus individual put options
suggests that index options should have become more expensive, not cheaper during the crisis.
Short-dated put options (with maturity less than 10 days) are more liquid than long-dated
options; they experience a larger increase in trade during the crisis. We verified above that our
results are robust across option maturities.
Table IX reports the same liquidity statistics for calls. Calls and puts are similarly liquid yet
display very different basket-index spread behavior. Finally, the increase in the basket-index spread
during the crisis is also present in shorter-dated options, which are more liquid. All these facts
suggest that illiquidity is an unlikely explanation for our findings.
25Absolute bid-ask spreads increase during the crisis but this is explained by the rise in put prices during the
crisis. Absolute bid-ask spreads increase by less than the price.
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8 Conclusion
We uncover new evidence from option prices that suggests the government absorbs aggregate tail
risk by providing a sector-wide bailout guarantee to the financial sector. In doing so, the government
subsidizes private insurance against financial sector systemic risk. In turn, this effectively bends
down the implied volatility skew for index put options on the financial sector, and causes the spread
between the price of financial index puts and a basket of individual bank puts to diverge. These
effects are clearly visible in options prices during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
A simple, single factor model helps us to understand whether fluctuations in the basket-index
put spread may be attributed to changing risk exposure, or if something more is needed. The stan-
dard model fares poorly in explaining the sharp increase in the financial sector put spread during
the crisis. But a modification of the standard model that truncates downside risk in the financial
sector does a much better job explaining crisis put spread behavior. These results are consistent
with the interpretation that the government provides a collective bailout guarantee to the bank-
ing sector. Direct evidence of basket-index spread dynamics around government announcements
confirms this interpretation.
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Table I: Basket-Index Spreads on Out-of-the-Money Options
Fin. Non-fin. Diff.
Puts Calls Puts Calls Puts Calls
Panel I: TTM = 365
Full Sample mean 2.94 0.99 2.69 2.02 0.25 -1.03
std 2.52 0.10 1.08 0.25 1.69 0.19
max 15.87 1.27 7.58 2.75 10.17 -0.71
Pre-Crisis mean 1.71 0.95 2.26 1.90 -0.55 -0.95
std 0.35 0.07 0.59 0.13 0.33 0.09
max 3.76 5.10 9.65 4.57 0.44 2.08
Crisis mean 5.85 1.08 3.70 2.31 2.15 -1.23
std 3.01 0.10 1.27 0.21 2.08 0.23
max 15.87 1.27 7.58 2.75 10.17 -0.71
Panel II: TTM = 30
Full Sample mean 0.68 0.43 0.58 0.56 0.11 -0.13
std 0.61 0.16 0.25 0.16 0.41 0.08
max 3.98 1.08 1.98 1.31 2.66 0.20
Pre-Crisis mean 0.40 0.35 0.48 0.48 -0.08 -0.13
std 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.07
max 0.76 1.71 2.26 0.95 0.86 0.95
Crisis Sample mean 1.36 0.62 0.81 0.74 0.55 -0.13
std 0.78 0.17 0.30 0.15 0.53 0.09
max 3.98 1.08 1.98 1.31 2.66 0.20
This table reports summary statistics for the basket-index spread in the cost of insurance per dollar insured for
financials, non-financials and their difference (financials minus non-financials) . Numbers reported are in cents per
dollar of strike price. The full sample covers 1/2003-6/2009. The pre-crisis sample covers 1/2003-7/2007. The crisis
sample covers 8/2007-6/2009. ∆ is 20. In the top half of the table, time-to-maturity is 365 days, in the bottom half
it is 30 days. Spreads are constructed using strike-matching as described in Section 3.
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Table II: Summary Statistics for Spreads on Options Sorted by Moneyness
Fin. Non-fin. Diff.
Puts Calls Puts Calls Puts Calls
∆ = 20
Full mean 2.94 0.99 2.69 2.02 0.25 −1.03
max 15.87 1.27 7.58 2.75 10.17 −0.71
Pre-Crisis mean 1.71 0.95 2.26 1.90 −0.55 −0.94
max 3.76 1.19 4.57 2.29 0.44 −0.73
Crisis mean 5.86 1.08 3.70 2.31 2.15 −1.23
max 15.87 1.27 7.58 2.75 10.17 −0.71
∆ = 30
Full mean 2.13 1.49 2.53 2.59 −0.39 −1.10
max 14.09 2.00 7.36 3.56 9.54 −0.47
Pre-Crisis mean 1.19 1.44 2.16 2.44 −0.97 −1.00
max 2.45 1.86 4.01 3.00 0.66 −0.71
Crisis mean 4.38 1.62 3.41 2.96 0.97 −1.34
max 14.09 2.00 7.36 3.56 9.54 −0.47
∆ = 40
Full mean 2.58 2.18 2.74 2.34 −0.16 −0.15
max 14.29 3.05 7.11 3.13 8.84 0.75
Pre-Crisis mean 1.62 2.09 2.38 2.24 −0.76 −0.16
max 2.95 2.79 4.60 2.75 1.45 0.27
Crisis mean 4.87 2.41 3.60 2.56 1.27 −0.14
max 14.29 3.05 7.11 3.13 8.84 0.75
∆ = 50
Full mean 3.08 1.16 3.45 2.99 −0.36 −1.83
max 15.59 2.18 8.01 4.19 9.25 −0.43
Pre-Crisis mean 2.11 1.40 3.04 2.87 −0.93 −1.47
max 4.01 2.18 5.70 3.59 1.59 −0.43
Crisis mean 5.39 0.58 4.40 3.27 0.99 −2.68
max 15.59 2.08 8.01 4.19 9.25 −1.26
This table reports summary statistics for the basket-index spread in the cost of insurance per dollar insured for
financials, non-financials and their difference (financials minus non-financials) using strike-matching. Numbers
reported are in cents per dollar of strike price. The full sample covers 1/2003-6/2009. The pre-crisis sample covers
1/2003-7/2007. The crisis sample covers 8/2007-6/2009. Spreads are constructed using strike-matching as described
in Section 3.
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Table III: Basket-Index Spreads on Out-of-the-Money Options in Other Sectors
Full Crisis –
Sector Sample Pre-Crisis Crisis Pre-Crisis
Financials mean 2.94 1.71 5.86 4.15
max 15.87 3.76 15.87 12.11
Consumer Disc. mean 3.58 2.92 5.12 2.20
max 12.40 6.35 12.40 6.05
Materials mean 3.04 2.28 4.84 2.57
max 10.34 4.54 10.34 5.80
Technology mean 3.30 2.89 4.27 1.38
max 9.54 6.27 9.54 3.27
Healthcare mean 2.52 2.02 3.69 1.67
max 8.59 5.33 8.59 3.26
Industrials mean 2.90 2.62 3.57 0.95
max 7.04 5.17 7.04 1.87
Consumer Staples mean 2.28 1.96 3.05 1.09
max 7.90 3.82 7.90 4.08
Utilities mean 1.87 1.55 2.63 1.08
max 6.79 3.90 6.79 2.89
Energy mean 1.99 1.79 2.46 0.67
max 5.74 5.35 5.74 0.39
This table reports the average basket-index put spread in the cost of insurance per dollar insured for the nine S&P
500 sector ETFs. Numbers reported are in cents per dollar of the strike price. The full sample covers 1/2003-6/2009.
The pre-crisis sample covers 1/2003-7/2007. The crisis sample covers 8/2007-6/2009. ∆ is 20, time to maturity is
365 days. Sectors are listed in descending order by mean crisis spread. The last column reports the increase in sector
put spread from pre-crisis to crisis in cents per dollar and percentage increase over pre-crisis spread, respectively.
Spreads are constructed using strike-matching as described in Section 3.
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Table IV: Basket-Index Put Spreads (Actual vs. Black-Scholes Model)
Financials Non-financials Difference
Index Basket Basket-Index Spread Index Basket Basket-Index Spread Spread
(1) BS (2) data (3) BS (4) data (5) BS (6) data (7) data-BS (1) BS (2) data (3) BS (4) data (5) BS (6) data (7) data-BS data-BS
Full mean 5.04 5.15 8.70 8.08 3.66 2.94 −0.73 3.88 3.87 8.13 6.56 4.25 2.69 −1.57 0.84
max 25.00 26.45 32.98 33.77 8.11 15.87 9.30 11.62 12.15 15.21 19.25 6.97 7.58 4.36 7.84
Pre- mean 3.13 3.15 6.60 4.86 3.47 1.71 −1.76 3.10 3.06 7.40 5.32 4.31 2.26 −2.05 0.29
Crisis max 6.78 6.65 10.58 9.22 7.34 3.76 1.37 5.45 5.10 10.49 9.65 6.97 4.57 0.81 3.40
Crisis mean 9.61 9.91 13.72 15.77 4.11 5.86 1.75 5.76 5.81 9.87 9.51 4.11 3.70 −0.41 2.16
max 25.00 26.45 32.98 33.77 8.11 15.87 9.30 11.62 12.15 15.21 19.25 5.50 7.58 4.36 7.84
This table reports summary statistics for basket and index put prices for financials, non-financials and their difference (financials minus non-financials)
comparing the Black-Scholes model predictions to the observed data. Numbers reported are in cents per dollar of strike price. The full sample covers
1/2003-6/2009. The pre-crisis sample covers 1/2003-7/2007. The crisis sample covers 8/2007-6/2009. ∆ is 20. We choose the index option with the same
weighted average strike as the individual options. We use implied volatilities for the index and the realized correlations to back out the implied volatility
for the individual stocks. Daily pairwise conditional correlations for stocks are estimated using the exponential smoother with smoothing parameter 0.95.
Pairwise correlations within the sector are then averaged each day, weighted by the pairs’ combined market equity.
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Table V: Correlations implied by Black-Scholes
Financials Non-financials
Puts Calls Puts Calls
Actual Implied Spread Implied Spread Actual Implied Spread Implied Spread
Full mean 0.51 0.62 0.11 0.66 0.15 0.39 0.55 0.15 0.43 0.04
max 0.74 0.85 0.41 0.87 0.37 0.75 0.73 0.43 0.56 0.19
Pre-Crisis mean 0.45 0.64 0.19 0.62 0.17 0.34 0.54 0.20 0.42 0.08
max 0.73 0.80 0.41 0.76 0.37 0.57 0.71 0.43 0.52 0.19
Crisis mean 0.65 0.57 -0.07 0.74 0.09 0.52 0.56 0.04 0.47 -0.04
max 0.74 0.85 0.23 0.87 0.25 0.75 0.73 0.30 0.56 0.14
This table compares realized correlations to Black-Scholes implied correlations from put and call options. The
implied correlation is chosen such that the basket-index spread in the data equals the Black-Scholes basket-index
spread. The full sample covers 1/2003-6/2009. The pre-crisis sample covers 1/2003-7/2007. The crisis sample
covers 8/2007-6/2009. ∆ is 20. We choose the index option with the same strike as the individual options. We
use implied volatilities for the index. Daily pairwise conditional correlations for stocks are estimated using the
exponential smoother with smoothing parameter 0.95. Pairwise correlations within the sector are then averaged
each day, weighted by the pairs’ combined market equity.
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Table VI: Basket-Index Put Spreads for Largest Banks (Actual vs. Model with Bailout)
Basket Big 12 C AIG BoA JP Wells Wach GS Amex MS Merrill Fannie Freddie
Pre-Crisis mean 0.20 −0.16 −0.02 0.77 −0.95 −0.58 1.08 0.24 −0.34 −0.07 −1.08 −0.38 −0.57 0.02
max 3.70 2.89 2.26 3.04 4.21 3.32 3.16 3.21 1.69 2.42 2.37 2.27 3.11 3.61
Crisis mean 1.69 −1.11 −0.92 −0.59 −3.70 −0.49 −0.10 −5.35 −0.48 1.79 −4.60 −1.05 0.63 1.51
max 13.58 19.49 27.71 18.38 41.78 14.00 15.39 13.49 17.48 18.84 25.77 9.12 12.88 19.10
This table reports the difference between the actual and the BS price put option price (per dollar insured). Numbers reported are in cents per dollar
of strike price. The full sample covers 1/2003-6/2009. The pre-crisis sample covers 1/2003-7/2007. The crisis sample covers 8/2007-6/2009. ∆ is 20.
We choose the index option with the same weighted average strike as the individual options. We use a one-year-ahead GARCH-based forecast for stock
return volatilities. Rolling volatilities are estimated from daily returns using a one year backward looking window. The cost of the basket is computed
as described in Section 4.1. Data for Wachovia and Merrill Lynch end in December 2008, while data for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae end in September
2008. For these four firms that exit the sample early, the reported averages for the crisis period end at their exit date.
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Table VII: Basket-Index Spreads (Actual and Bailout Model vs. Model without Bailout)
Data Minus Models: Bailout Minus No Bailout
No Bailout J = 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 ∞
Panel I: Financials
Full mean −0.73 0.71 0.62 0.54 0.52 0.44 0.29 0.17 0.08 0.00
max 9.30 2.81 4.63 6.55 7.98 8.13 9.10 10.95 7.60 0.00
Pre-Crisis mean −1.76 0.71 0.15 −0.00 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 0.00
max 1.37 2.08 2.40 0.79 0.15 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00
Crisis mean 1.75 0.71 1.75 1.84 1.79 1.52 1.00 0.58 0.29 0.00
max 9.30 2.81 4.63 6.55 7.98 8.13 9.10 10.95 7.60 0.00
Panel II: Non-financials
Full mean −1.09 0.63 0.64 0.28 0.10 0.02 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.00
max 4.46 1.60 3.16 3.70 3.23 3.27 2.06 0.90 0.32 0.00
Pre-Crisis mean −1.48 0.59 0.33 0.04 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 0.00
max 0.97 1.00 1.83 0.83 0.17 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00
Crisis mean −0.17 0.73 1.38 0.85 0.38 0.11 0.01 −0.02 −0.02 0.00
max 4.46 1.60 3.16 3.70 3.23 3.27 2.06 0.90 0.32 0.00
This table reports summary statistics for the BS-adjusted basket-index put spread in the data and in the model with
bailouts. Numbers reported are in percent of the strike price. The full sample covers 1/2003-6/2009. The pre-crisis
sample covers 1/2003-7/2007. The crisis sample covers 8/2007-6/2009. ∆ is 20. We choose the index option with
the same weighted average strike as the individual options. We use implied volatilities for the index and the realized
correlations to back out the implied volatility for the individual stocks. Daily pairwise conditional correlations for
stocks are estimated using the exponential smoother with smoothing parameter 0.95. Pairwise correlations within
the sector are then averaged each day, weighted by the pairs’ combined market equity.
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Table VIII: Liquidity in Puts
0 ≤ ∆ < 20 20 ≤ ∆ < 50 50 ≤ ∆ < 80 80 ≤ ∆ < 100
Spr. ($) Spr. (%) Vol. O.I. Spr. ($) Spr. (%) Vol. O.I. Spr. ($) Spr. (%) Vol. O.I. Spr. ($) Spr. (%) Vol. O.I.
Pre-Crisis Sample 10 Days < TTM ≤ 90 Days
S&P 500 0.450 80.5% 1072 15783 1.295 9.4% 2219 16594 1.821 5.8% 693 6807 1.959 3.7% 93 3138
All Sector SPDRs 0.133 150.5% 80 3205 0.141 35.0% 867 7606 0.167 13.7% 269 3221 0.239 7.9% 26 339
Financial SPDR 0.096 142.3% 187 10494 0.109 30.9% 1791 19708 0.125 12.4% 502 7907 0.182 7.0% 44 689
Indiv. Stocks 0.088 106.3% 169 5447 0.106 13.2% 836 9225 0.152 6.2% 473 5990 0.230 3.1% 76 1550
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.095 103.5% 142 4534 0.116 13.4% 691 7667 0.169 6.4% 380 4888 0.254 3.3% 65 1288
90 Days < TTM ≤ 180 Days
S&P 500 0.701 56.3% 373 18107 1.719 6.9% 1242 22052 1.982 3.4% 198 5962 2.076 1.5% 14 1949
All Sector SPDRs 0.141 96.0% 21 1132 0.156 19.0% 163 3057 0.198 8.7% 40 1258 0.273 6.3% 3 118
Financial SPDR 0.103 71.0% 103 4307 0.119 16.8% 452 13713 0.142 7.6% 96 3891 0.182 4.9% 16 347
Indiv. Stocks 0.094 72.4% 66 4326 0.133 8.1% 278 7760 0.196 4.3% 123 4622 0.242 2.3% 21 1138
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.103 68.4% 56 3445 0.147 8.3% 229 6509 0.216 4.4% 103 3565 0.271 2.5% 18 807
180 Days < TTM ≤ 365 Days
S&P 500 1.067 33.7% 237 12015 2.093 5.5% 400 10895 2.185 2.6% 52 2837 2.174 1.1% 4 1359
All Sector SPDRs 0.130 60.6% 9 857 0.156 12.8% 45 1290 0.203 6.8% 10 593 0.273 4.7% 2 129
Financial SPDR 0.095 47.5% 24 2448 0.105 10.8% 287 7823 0.139 5.6% 53 3313 0.188 4.0% 4 128
Indiv. Stocks 0.103 55.3% 52 4432 0.156 6.8% 170 6880 0.224 3.8% 65 4040 0.255 2.1% 15 1208
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.112 49.8% 48 3782 0.174 7.0% 130 5582 0.247 3.9% 50 2972 0.278 2.2% 11 756
Crisis Sample 10 Days < TTM ≤ 90 Days
S&P 500 1.120 61.7% 1369 14797 2.663 9.4% 2652 18992 2.974 4.5% 871 14305 3.033 2.4% 120 9284
All Sector SPDRs 0.087 59.4% 667 8801 0.130 11.8% 2849 20540 0.226 6.9% 963 12846 0.388 4.8% 72 3724
Financial SPDR 0.042 24.7% 4422 52042 0.054 6.5% 12983 88367 0.107 4.4% 4336 56684 0.206 3.7% 376 19916
Indiv. Stocks 0.108 55.5% 344 5590 0.153 7.9% 1170 9400 0.244 4.5% 529 6857 0.481 2.9% 87 2404
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.126 56.2% 296 4390 0.181 8.1% 1041 8047 0.288 4.6% 452 5741 0.516 3.0% 83 2435
90 Days < TTM ≤ 180 Days
S&P 500 1.723 35.2% 568 16641 3.003 6.2% 1147 18511 3.179 2.8% 212 12697 3.255 1.3% 25 7625
All Sector SPDRs 0.112 31.1% 209 4218 0.184 8.1% 527 8681 0.286 4.9% 162 5310 0.407 3.6% 17 1598
Financial SPDR 0.055 18.7% 1421 24285 0.079 5.3% 3012 49466 0.159 4.0% 1008 28769 0.227 3.0% 129 8338
Indiv. Stocks 0.133 38.2% 119 4640 0.214 5.5% 339 7705 0.318 3.2% 115 4908 0.492 2.2% 15 1593
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.154 37.9% 106 3405 0.253 5.6% 301 6235 0.376 3.3% 94 4085 0.536 2.2% 16 1637
180 Days < TTM ≤ 365 Days
S&P 500 2.402 22.3% 272 12355 3.409 4.7% 507 13293 3.538 2.1% 60 7814 3.593 1.1% 8 5226
All Sector SPDRs 0.177 22.1% 57 1693 0.300 7.8% 169 3428 0.410 4.8% 50 3257 0.474 3.3% 44 1818
Financial SPDR 0.057 12.9% 238 7318 0.089 4.5% 1049 19391 0.170 3.5% 300 13661 0.219 2.4% 121 6042
Indiv. Stocks 0.186 30.4% 69 2713 0.294 5.5% 173 5372 0.423 3.1% 55 3653 0.623 2.2% 9 1269
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.208 30.6% 54 1984 0.338 5.8% 162 4654 0.474 3.3% 47 3529 0.630 2.3% 9 1459
The full sample covers 1/2003-6/2009. The pre-crisis sample covers 1/2003-7/2007. The crisis sample covers 8/2007-6/2009. The stats reported for
individual and sector options are value-weighted.
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Table IX: Liquidity in Calls
0 ≤ ∆ < 20 20 ≤ ∆ < 50 50 ≤ ∆ < 80 80 ≤ ∆ < 100
Spr. ($) Spr. (%) Vol. O.I. Spr. ($) Spr. (%) Vol. O.I. Spr. ($) Spr. (%) Vol. O.I. Spr. ($) Spr. (%) Vol. O.I.
Pre-Crisis Sample 10 Days < TTM ≤ 90 Days
S&P 500 0.405 96.9% 1002 11990 1.204 10.3% 1598 12885 1.836 5.3% 930 11351 2.006 1.9% 71 3476
All Sector SPDRs 0.123 169.3% 23 745 0.135 42.3% 262 2970 0.160 14.3% 187 2790 0.236 7.4% 16 931
Financial SPDR 0.081 177.4% 22 1497 0.107 38.2% 512 6477 0.129 13.4% 311 6428 0.183 6.7% 28 1995
Indiv. Stocks 0.077 140.7% 203 5916 0.100 14.6% 1430 14839 0.144 6.1% 928 11702 0.229 3.1% 186 3840
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.083 138.1% 179 4926 0.110 15.1% 1145 11640 0.160 6.2% 738 9123 0.252 3.3% 142 3189
90 Days < TTM ≤ 180 Days
S&P 500 0.592 85.7% 301 10160 1.662 8.2% 703 17315 1.983 3.0% 364 13038 2.049 1.1% 22 3148
All Sector SPDRs 0.134 122.8% 8 434 0.154 24.1% 59 1481 0.195 9.1% 50 1365 0.282 5.9% 4 306
Financial SPDR 0.085 94.5% 12 1012 0.120 22.2% 134 4566 0.148 8.1% 109 3734 0.214 5.0% 7 748
Indiv. Stocks 0.082 112.2% 77 4798 0.122 9.5% 512 11756 0.187 4.5% 262 8052 0.251 2.4% 34 2248
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.089 111.2% 60 3468 0.136 9.9% 395 8320 0.207 4.6% 187 5686 0.279 2.5% 26 1567
180 Days < TTM ≤ 365 Days
S&P 500 0.872 50.0% 113 6705 2.001 6.9% 249 10021 2.198 2.3% 106 7283 2.224 0.9% 11 1200
Sector SPDRs 0.121 89.4% 3 455 0.151 17.2% 23 1070 0.204 7.0% 19 825 0.270 4.8% 2 258
Financial SPDR 0.088 64.8% 7 493 0.108 15.1% 48 2362 0.139 5.8% 45 2548 0.198 3.7% 3 497
Indiv. Stocks 0.090 93.6% 51 5189 0.143 8.5% 259 9021 0.215 4.1% 147 6730 0.271 2.2% 23 2363
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.096 96.1% 40 3962 0.158 8.9% 207 6783 0.238 4.3% 109 5349 0.292 2.3% 16 1877
Crisis Sample 10 Days < TTM ≤ 90 Days
S&P 500 0.705 118.6% 580 10797 2.497 11.4% 1857 16012 2.968 4.3% 1047 9846 3.047 1.8% 50 2157
All Sector SPDRs 0.080 103.7% 390 7908 0.121 14.1% 3386 19642 0.211 7.2% 1552 11705 0.350 4.6% 98 2581
Financial SPDR 0.037 47.7% 3007 52259 0.050 8.5% 17312 93957 0.097 4.8% 8020 56259 0.178 4.0% 628 19025
Indiv. Stocks 0.094 96.6% 341 6754 0.141 9.5% 1623 11596 0.230 4.8% 838 7407 0.446 3.1% 103 2423
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.110 93.6% 293 5739 0.169 10.0% 1362 9587 0.263 4.9% 754 6157 0.490 3.3% 104 1742
90 Days < TTM ≤ 180 Days
S&P 500 1.067 97.4% 183 10138 2.913 8.8% 637 12846 3.167 3.0% 326 4394 3.219 1.3% 13 912
All Sector SPDRs 0.099 81.2% 109 4741 0.168 10.8% 480 7791 0.278 5.6% 219 3878 0.394 3.6% 19 702
Financial SPDR 0.051 50.3% 749 25321 0.077 8.2% 2916 42929 0.139 4.4% 1193 18780 0.219 3.5% 107 3391
Indiv. Stocks 0.118 75.5% 100 5023 0.197 7.5% 460 9358 0.299 3.9% 216 5972 0.496 2.5% 25 1818
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.136 73.9% 93 4523 0.236 7.9% 375 7207 0.350 4.1% 181 4543 0.537 2.7% 19 1269
180 Days < TTM ≤ 365 Days
S&P 500 1.625 66.6% 62 8211 3.420 7.7% 237 8752 3.500 2.5% 126 4713 3.485 1.1% 5 510
All Sector SPDRs 0.151 63.6% 45 2964 0.280 11.6% 162 4348 0.411 5.8% 77 2034 0.507 3.8% 6 431
Financial SPDR 0.054 35.2% 154 8949 0.088 7.5% 836 18346 0.151 4.1% 480 11201 0.207 3.0% 18 1960
Indiv. Stocks 0.159 62.1% 57 4033 0.274 8.0% 210 5991 0.395 4.2% 118 3886 0.609 2.8% 14 891
Fin. Indiv. Stocks 0.170 63.9% 54 4381 0.311 8.6% 190 5345 0.451 4.5% 103 3124 0.630 3.1% 13 702
The full sample covers 1/2003-6/2009. The pre-crisis sample covers 1/2003-7/2007. The crisis sample covers 8/2007-6/2009. The stats reported for
individual and sector options are value-weighted.
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Figure 1: Cost Per Dollar Insured - Financial Sector
The dashed (full) line shows the cost per dollar insured for the index Callindex
cdi,f
(basket, Callbasket
cdi,f
). The dotted line plots their difference.
∆ is 20 for the index option. Time to maturity is 365 days. The top panel looks at puts. The bottom looks at calls. Spreads are
constructed using strike-matching as described in Section 3.
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Figure 2: Basket-Index Spread in Cost Per Dollar Insured Inferred from Puts
The dashed (full) line shows the difference in the cost per dollar insured between the basket and the index: Putbasket
cdi,i
− Putindex
cdi,i
for
financials (non-financials). The dotted line plots their difference. ∆ is 20 for the index option. Time to maturity is 365 days. We choose
the individual options with the same strike as the index option.
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Figure 3: Implied Volatility Skew Inferred from Calls
The figure plots the average implied volatility difference (basket minus index) inferred from puts (top panel) and calls (bottom panel) for
financials and non-financials against moneyness. The pre-crisis sample covers 1/2003-7/2007. The crisis sample covers 8/2007-6/2009.37
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Figure 4: Implied Volatility Minus Realized Volatility Versus Index Level
The figure plots the difference between Black-Scholes implied volatility (using |∆| = 20 and TTM = 365 options) and realized volatility
against the price level on the financial sector ETF and value-weighted average price of the eight non-financial sector ETFs, as well as
the best fit line for each sector. The first figure shows data and fit for the pre-crisis sample (1/2003-7/2007) and the second figure shows
the crisis sample (8/2007-6/2009). In order to align realized volatility with the forward-looking nature of one year implied volatility, we
calculate realized volatility using a forward-looking 252-day rolling volatility of daily returns on the underlying. Our estimated effects
are quantitatively robust to using backward looking rolling windows and shorter window lengths.
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Figure 5: Basket-Index Put Spreads (Actual Minus Black-Scholes Model)
The dashed (full) line shows the actual minus Black-Scholes basket-index put spread for the financials (non-financials). The dotted line
plots their difference. ∆ is 20. Time to maturity is 365 days. We choose the index option with the same strike as the individual options.
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Figure 6: Basket-Index Put Spreads (Actual vs. Model with Bailout)
The dashed line shows the observed basket-index put spread for financials. The dashed line plots the same object for the single-factor
model with bailouts. The dotted line plots the difference between the basket-index put spreads for the single-factor model with bailout
minus that implied by the single-factor model without bailout guarantee. ∆ is 20 and time to maturity is 365 days. We choose the
index option with the same strike as the individual options. We use the implied volatility for the index and the realized correlations
to back out the implied volatility for the individual stocks. Daily pairwise conditional correlations for stocks are estimated using the
exponential smoother with smoothing parameter 0.95. Pairwise correlations within the sector are then averaged each day, weighted by
the pairs’ combined market equity.
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Panel I: Difference-in-differences (data minus Black-Scholes and basket minus index)
−5 0 5
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
days after announcement
cha
nge
 in 
spr
ead
, ce
nts
 pe
r d
olla
r in
sur
ed
Positive Announcements
−5 0 5
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
days after announcement
cha
nge
 in 
spr
ead
, ce
nts
 pe
r d
olla
r in
sur
ed
Negative Announcements
Panel II: Triple Difference (financials minus non-financials, data minus Black-Scholes, and basket minus index)
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Figure 7: Basket-Index Spread Event Study Around Government Announcements
Panel I shows the basket-index spread difference-in-differences (data minus Black-Scholes and basket minus index) around announcement
dates. Panel II shows the basket-index spread triple difference (financials minus non-financials, data minus Black-Scholes, and basket-
index) around announcement dates. Figures on the left and right show responses to positive and negative announcements, respectively.
In each figure, the solid line shows the average spread response over all announcements, and the dotted lines show the responses to
each individual announcement. Spreads use options with ∆ = 20 and TTM = 365, and are constructed using strike-matching. BS
basket-index spreads are computed using the implied index volatility.
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Figure 8: Short Sale Lending Fees Versus Put Spreads
The red line shows the difference in put spreads (financials minus non-financials, ∆ = 20 and TTM = 365) in cents per dollar insured
(corresponding to the right vertical axis). The red line shows the difference in value-weighted securities lending fees (financials minus
non-financials) in basis points (corresponding to the left vertical axis).
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Separate Appendix–Not for Publication
A Data Appendix
The S&P 500 Index is an unmanaged index of 500 common stocks that is generally considered repre-
sentative of the U.S. stock market. The Select Sector SPDR Trust consists of nine separate investment
portfolios (each a ‘Select Sector SPDR Fund’ or a ‘Fund’ and collectively the ‘Select Sector SPDR Funds’
or the ‘Funds’). Each Select Sector SPDR Fund is an ‘index fund’ that invests in a particular sector or
group of industries represented by a specified Select Sector Index. The companies included in each Select
Sector Index are selected on the basis of general industry classification from a universe of companies de-
fined by the Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite Stock Index (S&P 500). The nine Select Sector Indexes
(each a ‘Select Sector Index’) upon which the Funds are based together comprise all of the companies
in the S&P 500. The investment objective of each Fund is to provide investment results that, before
expenses, correspond generally to the price and yield performance of publicly traded equity securities of
companies in a particular sector or group of industries, as represented by a specified market sector index.
The financial sector’s ticker is XLF. Table A reports the XLF holdings before and after the crisis.
B ∆-Matched Spreads
An alternative to strike-matching is constructing the option basket to ensure that the ∆s of the two
insurance schemes are equal. We first fix an option ∆ to construct sector insurance positions. Next, we
find strike prices Ki,j (j = 1, 2, . . . , Ni) for individual stocks, and the strike price Ki for the index, to
match the targeted ∆ level. Next, we set xi to be the number of index options with strike Ki such that
the total dollar amount insured by the index equals the dollar amount insured by the basket:
xiKi =
Ni∑
j=1
si,jKi,j. (4)
The advantage of this approach is that both the index and individual options in the basket have the same
moneyness.
Table B reports results for our the ∆-matching approach to constructing the basket-index spread.
Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to strike-matched results reported in the main text.
C Appendix Gaussian Model
C.1 Individual Firm returns
An individual bank j’s stock return is given by
rj = µj − λjJa + σǫj,
Ja = min(Jr, J), Jr ∼ N (θr, δ2r )
where the shock ǫj is an idiosyncratic shock which is standard normally distributed and i.i.d. over time
and across firms. In contrast, the shock Ja is an aggregate shock, also i.i.d. over time. The common shock
is truncated by a government bailout for J <∞. The shocks Jr and ǫj are orthogonal; ǫj is uncorrelated
1
with the SDF. The process Jr is correlated with the SDF; define σm,J = Cov(m,J
r) and
βJ =
Cov(m,Jr)
V ar(Jr)
=
σm,J
δ2r
.
Below we will use the fact that, since m and Jr are bivariate normal, which implies that:
E[m|Jr] = E[m] + βJ (Jr − θr), and V [m|Jr] = V [m]− βJσm,J .
See Lemma 4 at the end of this appendix.
We are interested in computing the variance of returns and the covariance between a pair of returns.
This will allow us to compute the volatility of returns and the correlation of returns. Two auxiliary results
turn out to be useful:
Ei[J
a] = E[min(Jr, J)] = E[Jr1(Jr<J)] + JE[1(Jr≥J)]
= θrΦ
(
J − θr
δr
)
− δrφ
(
J − θr
δr
)
+ JΦ
(
θr − J
δri
)
≡ θa
and
Ei[J
a2] = E[min(Jr, J)2] = E[Jr21(Jr<J)] + J
2E[1(Jr≥J)]
=
(
δ2r + θ
2
r
)
Φ
(
J − θr
δr
)
− δr(J + θr)φ
(
J − θr
δr
)
+ J2Φ
(
θr − J
δr
)
,
≡ σ2a + θ2a
The variance of returns is:
V ar[rj] = E[
(
rj
)2
]− [E[rj]]2 = σ2 + (λj)2σ2a
Similarly, mean returns are given by:
E[rj ] = µj − λjθa.
Note that if there is no bailout guarantee, θa = θr and σ
2
a = δ
2
r , so that
V ar[rj] ≡ σ2nb = σ2 + (λj)2δ2r E[rj ] = µj − λjθr
The covariance of a pair of different firms’ returns (r1, r2) is:
Cov[r1i , r
2
i ] = E[r
1r2]− [E[r1]E[r2] = λ1λ2σ2a,
Define
χ = θr + σm,J .
2
In order to get the equity risk premium for an individual stock, start from the Euler equation:
1 = E
[
exp
(
m+ µj − λjJa + σǫj)]
= exp
(
µj + .5σ2
)
E
[
exp
(
m− λjJa)]
= exp(µj)
{
E
[
exp
(
m− λjJr) 1(Jr<J)]+ E [exp (m− λjJ) 1(Jr>J)]}
= exp
(
µj + .5σ2
){
Ψ(1,−λj ;m,Jr)Φ
(
J − χ+ λjδ2r
δr
)
+ exp(−rf − λjJ)Φ
(
θr − J
δr
)}
by Lemma 1
= exp
(
µj − rf + .5σ2
)
×
{
exp
(−λjχ+ .5(λj)2δ2r)Φ
(
J − χ+ λjδ2r
δr
)
+ exp(−λjJ)Φ
(
θr − J
δr
)}
which implies that the expected return equals:
µj = rf − .5σ2 − log
{
exp
(−λjχ+ .5(λj)2δ2r)Φ
(
J − χ+ λδ2r
δr
)
+ exp(−λjJ)Φ
(−J
δr
)}
. (5)
In the no-bailout case, J → +∞, and the equity risk premium (including Jensen term) becomes
µjnb − rf + .5σ2nb = λjχ.
C.2 Aggregation to Sector
We construct the value-weighted portfolio return of all stocks, the index, with portfolio weights w.
rindex = µindex − Ja + σindexǫindex,
where ǫindex is i.i.d. standard Normal, w′λ = 1, where µindex = w′µj, and where
σindex =
√
w′σσ′w ≈ 0
If the number of firms is large and the weights are equal across firms, the last term equals zero. Note that
we do not need to set it equal to zero.
Next, assume that diversification is complete so that rindex = µindex − Ja, and solve for µindex from
the Euler equation for the index return:
1 = E
[
exp
(
m+ µindex − Ja
)]
= exp(µindex)
{
Ψ(1,−1;m,Jr)Φ
(
J − χ+ δ2r
δr
)
+ exp(−rf − J)Φ
(
θr − J
δr
)}
by Lemma 1
= exp
(
µindex − rf
){
exp
(
−χ+ δ
2
r
2
)
Φ
(
J − χ+ δ2r
δr
)
+ exp(−J)Φ
(
θr − J
δr
)}
which implies
µindex = rf − log
{
exp
(
−χ+ δ
2
r
2
)
Φ
(
J − χ+ δ2r
δr
)
+ exp(−J)Φ
(
θr − J
δr
)}
. (6)
In the no-bailout case, this gives µindexnb = r
f − δ2r2 + χ.
3
D Valuing Options
The main technical contribution of the paper is to price options in the presence of a bailout guarantee.
We are interested in the price per dollar invested in a put option (cost per dollar insured) on a bank stock.
For simplicity, we assume that the option has a one-period maturity and is of the European type. We
denote the put price by Put:
Putt = Et
[
Mt+1 (K −Rt+1)+
]
,
where the strike price K is expressed as a fraction of a dollar (that is, K = 1 is the ATM option). The
option value in state i on stock j is:
Putj = E
[
M(K −Rj)+] = −E [exp (m+ rj) 1k>rj]+KE [exp (m) 1k>rj ] = −V1 + V2
We now compute this in terms of the underlying structural parameters. Define r˜ = µ + σǫ and r =
r˜ − λmin(Jr, J), where we omit the dependence on j for ease of notation. Our derivation below exploits
the normality of m and r˜, which are conditionally uncorrelated.
First term V1
V1 = E
[
exp (m+ r) 1k>r1Jr<J
]
+ E
[
exp (m+ r) 1k>r1Jr>J
]
= E
[
exp (m+ r˜ − λJr) 1k>r1Jr<J
]
+ E
[
exp (m+ r˜ − λJ) 1k>r1Jr>J
]
= V11 + V12
The first term V11 can be solved as follows:
V11 = E
[
exp (m+ r˜ − λJr) 1k>r1Jr<J
]
= E
[
E {exp (m+ r˜ − λJr) 1k+λJr>r˜|Jr} 1Jr<J
]
= E
[
E {exp (m+ r˜) 1k+λJr>r˜|Jr} exp (−λJr) 1Jr<J
]
= E
{
E[exp(m)|Jr]E[exp(r˜)1k+λJr>r˜|Jr]E[exp (−λJr) 1Jr<J |Jr]
}
= E
{
exp (E[m|Jr] + .5V [m|Jr])E[exp(r˜)1k+λJr>r˜|Jr] exp (−λJr) 1Jr<J
}
= E
{
exp (E[m] + βJ (J
r − θr) + .5V [m]− .5βJσm,J)E[exp(r˜)1k+λJr>r˜|Jr] exp (−λJr) 1Jr<J
}
= Ψ(1;m) exp (−βJθr − .5βJσm,J)E
{
E[exp(r˜)1k+λJr>r˜|Jr] exp ([βJ − λ] Jr) 1Jr<J
}
= Ψ(1;m)Ψ(1; r˜) exp (−βJθr − .5βJσm,J)E
{
Φ (φ0 + φ1J
r) exp ([βJ − λ] Jr) 1Jr<J
}
by Lemma 1
= Ψ(1;m)Ψ(1; r˜) exp
(
−βJθr − .5βJσm,J + .5 [βJ − λ]2 δ2r + [βJ − λ] θr
)
×Φ
(
φ0 − t1√
1 + φ21δ
2
r
,
J − t2
δr
; ρ
)
by Lemma 2
= Ψ(1;m)Ψ(1; r˜) exp
(
.5λ2δ2r − λ[σm,J + θr]
)
Φ
(
φ0 − t1√
1 + φ21δ
2
r
,
J − t2
δr
; ρ
)
where φ1 =
λ
σ
, φ0 =
φ1
λ
(
k − µ− σ2), t2 = θr + σm,J − λδ2r , t1 = −φ1t2, and ρ = −φ1δr√1+φ2
1
δ2r
. We have used
fact that m and Jr are jointly normal to calculate the conditional moments E[m|Jr] and V [m|Jr], as
discussed above.
4
Next, we turn to V12:
V12 = E
[
exp (m+ r˜ − λJ) 1k>r1Jr>J
]
= exp(−λJ)E {E[exp(m)|Jr]1Jr>J}E[exp(r˜)1k+λJ>r˜]
= exp(−βJθr − .5βJσm,J − λJ)Ψ(1;m)Ψ(1; r˜)Φ
(
λJ + k − µ− σ2
σ
)
E
[
exp(βJJ
r)1Jr>J
]
= exp(−λJ)Ψ(1;m)Ψ(1; r˜)Φ
(
λJ + k − µ− σ2
σ
)[
1− Φ
(
J − θr − σm,J
δr
)]
by Lemma 1
= exp(−λJ)Ψ(1;m)Ψ(1; r˜)Φ
(
λJ + k − µ− σ2
σ
)
Φ
(−J + θr + σm,J
δr
)
Second term V2
V2 = KE [exp (m) 1k>r]
= KE
[
exp (m) 1k>r1Jr<J
]
+KE
[
exp (m) 1k>r1Jr>J
]
= V21 + V22.
The first term V21 can be solved as follows:
V21 = KE
[
exp (m) 1k>r1Jr<J
]
= KE
[
E {exp (m) 1k+λJr>r˜|Jr} 1Jr<J
]
= KΨ(1;m) exp (−βJθr − .5βJσm,J)E
[
Φ (φ0 + φ1J
r) exp (βJJ
r) 1Jr<J
]
by Lemma 1
= KΨ(1;m)Φ
(
φ0 − t1√
1 + φ21δ
2
r
,
J − t2
δr
; ρ
)
by Lemma 2
where φ1 =
λ
σd
, φ0 =
φ1
λ
(k − µ), t2 = θr + σm,J , t1 = −φ1t2, ρ = −φ1δr√
1+φ2
1
δ2r
.
Finally, we turn to V22:
V22 = KE
[
exp (m) 1k>r1Jr>J
]
= KE
[
exp (m) 1k+λJ>r˜1Jr>J
]
= KE
{
E[exp(m)|Jr]1Jr>J
}
E
[
1k+λJ>r˜
]
= K exp(−βJθr − .5βJσm,J)Ψ(1;m)Φ
(
λJ + k − µ
σ
)
E
[
exp(βJJ
r)1Jr>J
]
= KΨ(1;m)Φ
(
λJ + k − µ
σ
)[
1− Φ
(
J − θr − σm,J
δr
)]
by Lemma 1
= KΨ(1;m)Φ
(
λJ + k − µ
σ
)
Φ
(−J + θr + σm,J
δr
)
.
Combining Terms Note that Ψ(1;m) = exp(−rft ) and that Ψ(1; r˜) = exp(µr + .5σ2) which is the
expected log stock return adjusted for a Jensen term. Note that the Jensen term only involves the
idiosyncratic risk. The correlation coefficient is ρ = −λδr√
σ2+λ2δ2r
. Recall the definitions:
χ = θr + σm,J and σ
2
nb = σ
2 + λ2δ2r .
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Combining the four terms, we get that the put price on an individual stock is given by (dependence on j
suppressed):
Put = − exp(µ− rf + .5σ2)
{
exp
(−λχ+ .5λ2δ2r)Φ
(
k − µ+ λχ− σ2nb
σnb
,
J − χ+ λδ2r
δr
; ρ
)
+exp(−λJ)Φ
(
k − µ− σ2 + λJ
σ
)
Φ
(−J + χ
δr
)}
+K exp(−rft )
{
Φ
(
k − µ+ λχ
σnb
,
J − χ
δr
; ρ
)
+Φ
(
k − µ+ λJ
σ
)
Φ
(−J + χ
δr
)}
(7)
Comparison with Black-Scholes To compare with Black-Scholes, set J = +∞. This implies, along
with µjnb − rf + .5σ2nb = λjχ, that
Put = −Φ
(
k − rf − .5σ2nb
σnb
)
+K exp(−rft )Φ
(
k − rf + .5σ2nb
σnb
)
.
Hence, our expression collapses to the standard Black-Scholes price for a put option in the absence of a
bailout guarantee.
The Index The index option price is a simple case of the general option pricing formula with µj =
µindex, λj = 1 and with σj = σindex. Under the additional assumption that σindex = 0, the derivation
simplifies somewhat. The variable r˜ is then no longer a random variable, but a constant. The four terms
of the put option formula become
V index11 = exp
(
µindex − rf + .5δ2r − χ
){
Φ
(
J − χ+ δ2r
δr
)
− Φ
(
µindex − k − χ+ δ2r
δr
)}
V index12 = exp(µ
index − rf − J)Φ
(−J + χ
δr
)
V index21 = K exp(−rf )
{
Φ
(
J − χ
δr
)
− Φ
(
µindex − k − χ
δr
)}
V index22 = K exp(−rf )Φ
(−J + χ
δr
)
Combining terms,
Putindex = − exp
(
µindex − rf
){
exp
(
.5δ2r − χ
) [
Φ
(
J − χ+ δ2r
δr
)
− Φ
(
µindex − k − χ+ δ2r
δr
)]
+exp(−J)Φ
(−J + χ
δr
)}
+K exp(−rf )Φ
(
k − µindexr + χ
δr
)
Note that this formula only holds if µindex < k + J . If instead µindex > k + J , then Putindex = 0.
E How to Operationalize
We need each of the inputs to formula (7). The six-step procedure below is for a given bailout level J .
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First, and without loss of generality, we set θr = 0, which makes J
r a mean-zero shock. Also, the
formula requires a zero-coupon risk-free rate rf which is readily available in the OptionMetrics data at
daily frequency.
Second, we can recover estimates for σnb and δr from the variance of an individual stock return,
(σj)2 = (λj)2σ2a + σ
2,
and from the variance of the index return,
(σindex)2 = σ2a + w
′σdσ′dw ≈ σ2a,
where w are the weights of the stocks in the index. When the number of firms is large and index components
are about equally weighted, the last term is approximately zero. These two variances can be estimated at
a daily frequency.
Third, abstracting from heterogeneity in λ, the correlation between two stocks in the index is ρ(rk, rj) =
λ2σ2a
λ2σ2a+σ
2 . The correlation should be estimated over the same (rolling) window as the individual and ag-
gregate variance. Now, we can back out an estimate for λ and σ2d from the correlation, the variance of the
individual return and the variance of the index return. We have σ2d = σ
2
r − (λj)2σ2a and λ = σr
√
ρi,j
σa
.
Fourth, the moments of the aggregate truncated shock derived above imply the following non-linear
equation, which we can solve based on observables to arrive at an estimate for the jump variance δr:
σ2a = δ
2
rΦ
(
J
δr
)
− δrJφ
(
J
δr
)
+ J2Φ
(−J
δr
)
− δ2rφ
(
J
δr
)2
− J2Φ
(−J
δr
)2
+ 2δrJφ
(
J
δr
)
Φ
(−J
δr
)
.
Finally, we must estimate the expected log index return. To do so, we rely on the equity risk premium
lower bound derived in Martin’s (2011) simple variance swap framework. He shows that the following
bound obtains under weak assumptions:
exp(rf )E[exp(rindex)− exp(rf )] ≥ SV IX2.
For our estimate, we assume that this bound holds with equality. Next, we make the Jensen inequality
adjustment
logE[exp(rindex)] = µindex + .5σ2a. (8)
This relationship is exact in the absence of a bailout (J =∞). When Ja is truncated, normality is violated
and the equality in (8) is an approximation. The expected return based on SV IX and the previously
discussed inputs is then calculated as
µindex = log
(
SV IX2
exp(rf )
+ exp(rf )
)
− σ
2
a
2
.
Our calculation of SV IX for this step uses financial sector index options with TTM = 30. Our construc-
tion follows Martin (2011), which effectively forms an equally weighted portfolio of index calls and puts
with varying strikes.
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F Auxiliary Lemmas
Lemma 1. Let x ∼ N(µx, σ2x) and y ∼ N(µy, σ2y) with Corr(x, y) = ρxy. Then
E[exp(ax+ by)1d<y<c] = Ψ(a, b;x, y)
{
Φ
(
c− µy − bσ2y − aρxyσxσy
σy
)
− Φ
(
d− µy − bσ2y − aρxyσxσy
σy
)}
where Ψ(a, b;x, y) = exp
(
aµx + bµy +
a2σ2x
2 +
b2σ2y
2 + abρxyσxσy
)
is the bivariate normal moment-generating
function of x and y evaluated at (a, b).
Proof. Lemma 1 First, note that x|y ∼ N
(
µx +
ρxyσx
σy
[y − µy], σ2x(1− ρ2xy)
)
, therefore
E[exp(ax)|y] = Q exp
(
aρxyσx
σy
y
)
where Q = exp
(
aµx − aρxyσxµyσy +
a2σ2x(1−ρ2xy)
2
)
. Denote Γ = E[exp(ax+ by)1d<y<c], then:
Γ = E[E{exp(ax)|y} exp(by)1d<y<c]
= QE
[
exp
(
y
{
aρxyσx
σy
+ b
})
1d<y<c
]
= Q
∫ c
d
exp
(
y
{
aρxyσx
σy
+ b
})
dF (y)
= Q
∫ c
d
exp
(
y
{
aρxyσx
σy
+ b+
µy
σ2y
}
− y
2
2σ2y
− µ
2
y
2σ2y
)
dy
σy
√
2π
Complete the square
= Q exp
(
σ2y
2
σy
{
aρxyσx
σy
+ b
}2
+ µy
{
aρxyσx
σy
+ b
})∫ c
d
exp

−
[
y − σ2y
{
aρxyσx
σy
+ b+
µy
σ2y
}]2
2σ2y

 dy
σy
√
2π
Substitute u =
y − σ2y
{
aρxyσx
σy
+ b+
µy
σ2y
}
σy
, duσy = dy
= exp
(
aµx +
a2σ2x(1− ρ2xy)
2
+
σ2y
2
{
aρxyσx
σy
+ b
}2
+ bµy
)
×
{
Φ
(
c− µy − bσ2y − aρxyσxσy
σy
)
− Φ
(
d− µy − bσ2y − aρxyσxσy
σy
)}
Lemma 2. Let x ∼ N(µx, σ2x), then
E [Φ (b0 + b1x) exp (ax) 1x<c] = Φ
(
b0 − t1√
1 + b21σ
2
x
,
c− t2
σx
; ρ
)
exp(z1) (9)
where t1 = −b1t2, t2 = aσ2x + µx, z1 = a
2σ2x
2 + aµx, ρ =
−b1σx√
1+b2
1
σ2x
, and Φ (· , · ; ρ) is the cumulative density
function (CDF) of a bivariate standard normal with correlation parameter ρ.
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Proof. Lemma 2 Denote Ω = E [Φ (b0 + b1x) exp (ax) 1x<c], then:
Ω =
∫ c
−∞
∫ b0+b1x
−∞
exp (ax) dF (v)dF (x)
=
∫ c
−∞
∫ b0+b1x
−∞
exp
(
ax− v
2
2
− [x− µx]
2
2σ2x
)
dv dx
σx2π
Substitute v = u+ b1x, dv = du
=
∫ c
−∞
∫ b0
−∞
exp
(
ax− (u+ b1x)
2
2
− [x− µx]
2
2σ2x
)
du dx
σx2π
=
∫ c
−∞
∫ b0
−∞
exp
(
−u
2
2
− x2
(
1
2σ2x
+
b21
2
)
− b1ux+ 0u+ x
(
a+
µx
σ2x
)
− µ
2
x
2σ2x
)
du dx
σx2π
Complete the square in two variables using Lemma 3
=
∫ c
−∞
∫ b0
−∞
exp
{(
u− t1
x− t2
)′(
s1 s2
s2 s3
)(
u− t1
x− t2
)
+ z1
}
du dx
σx2π
=
∫ c
−∞
∫ b0
−∞
exp
(
−1
2
(U − T )′(−2S)(U − T ) + z1
)
du dx
σx2π
where U = (u, x), T = (t1, t2),−2S =
(
1 b1
b1 b
2
1 +
1
σ2x
)
, (−2S)−1 =
(
1 + b21σ
2
x −b1σ2x
−b1σ2x σ2x
)
. This is the
CDF for U ∼ N(T, (−2S)−1). Let w1 = u−t1√
1+b2
1
σ2x
, w2 =
x−t2
σx
, and Σ =
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
)
with ρ = −b1σx√
1+b2
1
σ2x
. We
have that W ′ = (w1, w2) ∼ N(0,Σ). Also, du = dw1
√
1 + b21σ
2
x and dx = dw2σx.
Ω = exp(z1)
{∫ c−t2
σx
−∞
∫ b0−t1√
1+b2
1
σ2x
−∞
exp
(
−1
2
W ′Σ−1W
)
dw1 dw2
2π
√
1− ρ2
}√
1 + b21σ
2
x
√
1− ρ2
= Φ
(
b0 − t1√
1 + b21σ
2
x
,
c− t2
σx
; ρ
)
exp(z1)
where we used that
√
1 + b21σ
2
x
√
1− ρ2 = 1, and where completing the square implies t1 = −b1t2, t2 =
aσ2x + µx, s1 = −.5, s2 = −.5b1, s3 = −.5b21 − 12σ2x , and z1 =
a2σ2x
2 + aµx by application of Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Bivariate Complete Square
Ax2 +By2 +Cxy +Dx+ Ey + F =
(
x− t1
y − t2
)′(
s1 s2
s2 s3
)(
x− t1
y − t2
)
+ z1
where
t1 = −(2BD − CE)/(4AB − C2) s1 = A
t2 = −(2AE − CD)/(4AB − C2) s2 = C/2
z1 = F − BD
2 − CDE +AE2
4AB − C2 s3 = B.
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Lemma 4. Let Z ∼ N(µ, σ2) and define φ = φ
(
b−µ
σ
)
and Φ = Φ
(
b−µ
σ
)
. Then
E[Z1Z<b] = µΦ− σφ, (10)
E[Z21Z<b] =
(
σ2 + µ2
)
Φ− σ(b+ µ)φ (11)
Proof.
E[Z1Z<b] = E[Z|Z < b]Pr(Z < b) =
(
µ− σφ
Φ
)
Φ = µΦ− σφ
The second result is shown similarly:
E[Z21Z<b] = E[Z
2|Z < b]Pr(Z < b)
= (V ar[Z2|Z < b] + E[Z|Z < b]2)Pr(Z < b)
=
(
σ2 − σ(b− µ)φ
Φ
− σ2 φ
2
Φ2
+
[
µ− σφ
Φ
]2)
Φ
=
(
σ2 + µ2
)
Φ− σ(b+ µ)φ.
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Table A: Top 40 Holdings of the Financial Sector Index XLF
12/30/2010 07/30/2007
Name Weighting Name Weighting
1 JPMorgan Chase 9.01 Citigroup 11.1
2 Wells Fargo 8.86 Bank of America 10.14
3 Citigroup 7.54 AIG 8.02
4 Berkshire Hathaway 7.52 JPMorgan Chase 7.25
5 Bank of America 7.30 Wells Fargo 5.44
6 Goldman Sachs 4.66 Wachovia 4.35
7 U.S. Bancorp 2.82 Goldman Sachs 3.71
8 American Express 2.44 American Express 3.35
9 Morgan Stanley 2.25 Morgan Stanley & C 3.25
10 MetLife 2.21 Merrill Lynch 3.11
11 Bank of New York Mellon 2.04 Federal National Mortgage 2.81
12 PNC Financial Services 1.75 US Bancopr 2.51
13 Simon Property 1.60 Bank of New York Mellon 2.32
14 Prudential 1.56 Metlife 2.15
15 AFLAC 1.45 Prudential 2.00
16 Travelers 1.39 Federal Home Loan Mortgage 1.83
17 State Street 1.27 Travelers 1.63
18 CME Group 1.18 Washington Mutual 1.61
19 ACE Ltd. 1.15 Lehman Brothers 1.59
20 Capital One Financial 1.06 Allstate 1.56
21 BB&T 1.00 CME Group 1.46
22 Chubb 0.99 Capital One Financial 1.41
23 Allstate . 0.93 Hartford Financial 1.40
24 Charles Schwab 0.93 Suntrust Banks 1.35
25 T. Rowe Price 0.89 State Street 1.28
26 Franklin Resources 0.87 AFLAC 1.23
27 AON 0.82 PNC 1.11
28 Equity Residential 0.81 Regions Financial 1.02
29 Marsh & McLennan 0.81 Loews 1.02
30 SunTrust Banks 0.80 Franklin Resources 1.01
31 Ameriprise Financial 0.78 Charles Schwab 0.98
32 Public Storage 0.77 BB&T 0.98
33 Vornado Realty Trust 0.74 Fifth Third Bancorp 0.98
34 Northern Trust 0.73 Chubb 0.97
35 HCP 0.73 SLM 0.97
36 Progressive 0.71 Simon Property 0.93
37 Loews 0.67 ACE Ltd. 0.91
38 Boston Properties 0.66 National City 0.82
39 Host Hotels & Resorts 0.64 Countrywide Financial 0.81
40 Fifth Third Bancorp 0.64 Lincoln National 0.79
This table reports the XLF weights on 12/30/2010 and 07/30/2007. On 12/30/2010, there were 81 companies in
XLF; on 07/30/2007, there were 96 companies. This table reports the relative market capitalizations of the top 40
holdings of the index.
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Table B: ∆-Matched Basket-Index Spreads on Out-of-the-Money Options
Financials Non-financials F Minus NF
Puts Calls Puts Calls Puts Calls
Panel I: TTM = 365
Full Sample mean 1.69 0.24 1.11 0.21 0.59 0.03
std 1.89 0.16 0.69 0.09 1.44 0.10
max 12.46 0.49 4.13 0.36 9.07 0.44
Pre-Crisis mean 0.81 0.32 0.91 0.25 -0.10 0.07
std 0.20 0.06 0.44 0.05 0.34 0.05
max 2.27 0.49 3.09 0.36 0.95 0.20
Crisis mean 3.79 0.06 1.57 0.11 2.22 -0.06
std 2.39 0.17 0.90 0.10 1.71 0.13
max 12.46 0.37 4.13 0.29 9.07 0.44
Panel II: TTM = 30
Full Sample mean 0.30 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.02
std 0.33 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.27 0.09
max 2.46 0.27 0.65 0.24 1.86 0.32
Pre-Crisis mean 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.05
std 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.07
max 0.38 0.27 0.51 0.24 1.00 0.32
Crisis Sample mean 0.62 0.10 0.23 0.14 0.39 -0.04
std 0.48 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.37 0.08
max 2.46 0.27 0.65 0.24 1.87 0.25
This table reports summary statistics for the basket-index spread in the cost of insurance per dollar insured. Numbers
reported are in cents per dollar of strike price. The full sample covers 1/2003-6/2009. The pre-crisis sample covers
1/2003-7/2007. The crisis sample covers 8/2007-6/2009. ∆ is 20. In the top half of the table, time-to-maturity is
365 days, in the bottom half it is 30 days.
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